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ABSTRACT. This Note examines, through an experimental design, whether juror biases
against black defendants are explained by aversive racism theory or social identity theory and
whether procedural justice can be used to decrease biases. The Note also examines whether the
timing of debiasing jury instructions affects judgments of guilt. The experiment finds that pre-
evidence instructions result in lower judgments of guilt than post-evidence instructions. In addi-
tion, aversive racism theory, but not social identity theory or procedural justice, explains guilt
judgments. The experiment has implications for both the content and timing of jury instructions
in trials.
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INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the ac-
cused the "right to a... trial, by an impartial jury. .... " This assumes that ju-
rors can divorce themselves from any biases that they might have and decide
cases based on relevant evidence. Such assumptions are crucial to the legitima-
cy of the criminal justice system. If jurors do not carefully examine evidence in
order to make the best decision possible, then defendants' constitutional right
to an impartial jury will be undermined. Recent research into juror decision
making shows that jurors have difficulty remaining impartial and often exhibit
racial biases. Although this research has shown that black defendants are more
likely to be found guilty than white defendants for the same crime,' no research
thus far has investigated the underlying mechanism that causes these racial bi-
ases. Instead, many researchers have attributed such effects, post hoc, to aver-
sive racism theory.' However, social identity theory can also plausibly explain
such results. Briefly, aversive racism theory is based on the idea that today rac-
ism is more implicit and unconscious than explicit and conscious. Many indi-
viduals are not explicitly or consciously racist, and do not wish to be so, but
have implicit, unconscious biases that emerge when they are unable to monitor
their biases.4 Social identity theory, on the other hand, identifies a more con-
scious process, whereby individuals exhibit biases favoring ingroup members
and disfavoring outgroup members in order to raise the status of their in-
group.5
This Note builds on prior research and attempts to pinpoint which of these
two theories - aversive racism theory or social identity theory- better explains
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. E.g., Ellen S. Cohn et al., Reducing White Juror Bias: The Role of Race Salience and Racial Atti-
tudes, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1953, 1964 (2009); see also Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe
C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367, 1378 (2000) [hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, Race
in the Courtroom] (finding that white jurors are more likely to express racial biases when race
is not salient); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investiga-
tion of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 201, 225 (2001) [hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias] (same); Denis Chi-
maeze E. Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility,
15 J. EXPEluMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 133, 140 (1979) (noting that white jurors rate black de-
fendants as more culpable than white defendants when evidence is ambiguous).
3. See Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra note 2, at 225; see also Sommers & Ells-
worth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 2, at 1376 (stating that aversive racism theory may
explain the experimental result that white jurors have racial biases).
4. See discussion infra Part I.A.
5. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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juror biases. To determine which theory better explains biases and can simul-
taneously combat biases, the experiment in this Note manipulated the content
of jury instructions designed to reduce bias (referred to below as "debiasing ju-
ry instructions") and measured mock jurors' judgments of the guilt of black
defendants. This experiment also tested whether instructions based on proce-
dural justice can decrease juror biases. Procedural justice posits that individuals
are more likely to comply with legal rules, such as jury instructions, if they
view legal decision-making processes as fair.6 In addition to testing whether
the content of jury instructions can mitigate biases, this experiment examines
whether high or low explicit race salience7 and whether the presentation of in-
structions before or after the presentation of evidence affect jurors' guilt judg-
ments of black defendants.
Part I provides a theoretical overview of aversive racism theory, social iden-
tity theory, and procedural justice. Part II then provides empirical evidence in
support of the race-based aversive racism theory and social identity theory. It
investigates three shortcomings in aversive racism theory that the present ex-
periment attempts to resolve. It also proposes that the results from prior exper-
iments are compatible with social identity theory and urges that, as a result,
this theory should be investigated as a potential cause of juror biases.
Part III lays out the experimental hypotheses derived from aversive racism
theory, social identity theory, procedural justice, and the timing of jury instruc-
tions. In short, these hypotheses are as follows. First, if aversive racism theory
explains biases, then high explicit race salience and jury instructions that re-
mind jurors of their egalitarian views should decrease judgments of guilt for
aversive racists only. Second, if social identity theory explains biases, then low
explicit race salience and jury instructions that attempt to increase participants'
self-esteem should mitigate judgments of guilt for all participants. Third, if
procedural justice reduces juror biases, then debiasing jury instructions empha-
sizing procedural justice should decrease judgments of guilt for all participants.
Finally, the timing hypothesis predicts that the debiasing instructions, if they
work, should be more effective at decreasing biases and guilt judgments when
presented pre-evidence than when they are presented post-evidence.
Part IV presents the experimental methods used, including the sample of
participants, experimental design, materials, and procedure. Part V presents
the results of the experiment. The results suggest that aversive racism theory,
but not social identity theory, explains jurors' racial biases, and that instruc-
6. See discussion infra Part I.C.
7. In the experiment, explicit race salience refers to the experimental condition in which race
was specifically discussed and there was a picture of the defendant that made his race more
apparent. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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tions tailored to aversive racism theory are likely to reduce such biases. Addi-
tionally, the results do not support the hypothesis that jury instructions fo-
cused on procedural justice reduce biases. Finally, the results largely support
the timing hypothesis: jurors were less biased when the debiasing instructions
were presented before the evidence. Part VI discusses the results, limitations of
the experiment, and directions for future research. The Note concludes by out-
lining the practical implications of the experimental results and suggests that
judges ought to include debiasing elements based on aversive racism theory in
their jury instructions and present these instructions before the evidence phase
of the trial.
I. THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF JURORS' RACIAL BIASES
A. Aversive Racism Theory
Aversive racism is a modern form of racism in which whites exhibit implicit
biases-biases of which they are unaware but that have discriminatory effects-
against blacks.8 Although researchers have recognized that aversive racism the-
ory is not limited to whites and blacks, 9 the theory has typically focused on
whites' biases against blacks. '° Aversive racists are those who "regard them-
selves as nonprejudiced and nondiscriminatory; but, [they] almost unavoida-
bly[] possess negative feelings and beliefs about blacks."" They are high in im-
plicit racism, yet low in explicit racism-in other words, they are biased but are
8. Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE, DISCpIM-
INATION, AND RACISM 61, 62 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
9. Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, Understanding and Addressing Contemporary Racism:
From Aversive Racism to the Common Ingroup Identity Model, 61J. Soc. ISSUEs 615, 619 (2005).
1o. This Note focuses on white juror biases against black defendants, rather than biases be-
tween other racial groups, for two interrelated reasons. First, scholars have framed aversive
racism theory as explaining whites' biases against blacks rather than biases between other
groups. See generally JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY, at xi, xxiii-xxiv (1970)
(coining the term "aversive racism" and using it to explain whites' biases against blacks). See
also Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 9, at 617-19 (describing aversive racism in terms of
whites' biases against blacks, without mentioning other racial groups). Second, because of
this framing, the empirical research on juror biases has focused on white biases against black
defendants rather than between other groups. Recall that most researchers have attributed
white juror biases to aversive racism theory, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, so there
has been little exploration of whether white jurors may have biases against other racial
groups as well, even though social identity theory would predict such biases. I have there-
fore focused on these racial categories in order to respond and contribute to this body of lit-
erature.
ii. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 8, at 62.
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unaware of their biases. Because they are low in explicit racism and thus wish
to be non-racist in accordance with their egalitarian views, aversive racists sup-
press their prejudice toward blacks when they are made aware of their biases, 2
which occurs when race is made salient. 3 When race is not salient, and "norms
are ambiguous or conflicting, discrimination is often exhibited"'4 due to
whites' implicit biases. Aversive racism theory can be applied to the legal
realm: if race is made salient in the courtroom, then white jurors often sup-
press their negative attitudes toward black defendants in an attempt to appear
egalitarian, thereby reducing racially biased decision making.15 Conversely, in
trials in which racial factors are not salient, white jurors' implicit biases against
black defendants will emerge.' 6
B. Social Identity Theory
According to social identity theory, individuals categorize others into in-
groups or outgroups and favor members of the ingroup to enhance their own
self-image. 7 Social identity theory is derived from three assumptions about in-
dividual behavior and society. First, individuals wish to have high self-esteem,
which is defined as a positive self-concept."8 Second, social groups have posi-
tive and negative qualities, and individuals' personal social identities are de-
rived in part from society's evaluations of their social groups. 9 Third, the eval-
uation of an individual's ingroup is determined by social comparisons to other
groups.' These three assumptions lead to the core theoretical principles of so-
cial identity theory: (1) individuals wish to achieve a positive social identity
through (2) comparisons that favor the individual's ingroup and disfavor an
outgroup, and (3) if an individual's ingroup lags behind an outgroup, the indi-
vidual will leave the ingroup or try to improve the ingroup's image.'
12. Id.
13. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, "Race Salience" in Juror Decision-Making: Mis-
conceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 599, 6Ol (2009).
14. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 8, at 85.
15. See, e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 2, at 1371.
16. See, e.g., id.
17. See Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel eds.,
1979).
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At the core of social identity theory is the idea that individuals wish to have
a positive image of themselves and the status of one's ingroup contributes to
this image.' Thus, they favor the ingroup over an outgroup to improve the
image of the ingroup, which in turn improves their own self-image. 3 The logic
of social identity theory predicts that individuals may similarly favor their in-
group in criminal trials in order to increase their self-esteem. If ingroup
members are suspected of having committed a crime, individual members of
the group may be more lenient in judging the ingroup member. Otherwise, an
ingroup member's conviction might suggest the proclivity of the ingroup to-
ward crime. This in turn would lower the status of the ingroup and harm the
individual's self-esteem, because the status of the ingroup affects judgments of
one's self-esteem. Thus, social identity theory can plausibly explain why white
jurors judge black defendants to be guiltier than white defendants. White ju-
rors are harsher toward black defendants because those defendants belong to
an outgroup; by acting harshly toward an outgroup, white jurors indirectly
raise the status of their ingroup.
C. Procedural Justice
Unlike aversive racism theory and social identity theory, procedural justice
is a race-neutral theory that focuses on impartiality and fairness and thus does
not explain racial biases. Nevertheless, it may be employed to combat jurors' ra-
cial biases. According to this theory, individuals view the justice system as le-
gitimate if the process by which it reaches outcomes is perceived to be fair.2'
This legitimacy then leads to compliance with legal rules.26 Therefore, proce-
dural justice may lower racial biases by the following mechanism: if jurors are
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. This logic assumes that evidence is ambiguous. This assumption is reasonable in this con-
text, as many cases that actually go to trial (as opposed to being resolved by a guilty plea)
involve ambiguous evidence. When there is strong evidence incriminating a member of
one's ingroup, then individuals are actually more likely to convict the ingroup member, as
they are motivated to separate a clearly guilty member from the ingroup to preserve the in-
group's status. See infra text accompanying notes 74-78.
zs. See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975). Legitimacy is defined as a "sense of obligation or willingness to obey au-
thorities." Margaret Levi et al., Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs, 53
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 354, 356 (2009); see also Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of
Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAw & Soc'y REv.
513, 514 (2003) ("Legitimacy is a property of an authority or institution that leads people to
feel that that authority or institution is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed.").
26. Levi et al., supra note 25, at 356.
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primed with the idea that the process by which they reach a verdict is fair, they
will see juror decision making as more legitimate, and therefore will be more
likely to comply with jury instructions. So if jury instructions emphasize the
fairness of the decision-making process and stress impartiality or lack of bias,
jurors will be more likely to follow the instructions and suppress any biases
that they might have.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE THEORIES
A. Aversive Racism Theory
This Part and the next suggest that the race and juror decision-making lit-
erature has three significant limitations, which drive this Note's experimental
design. First, the literature's conceptualization of explicit race salience does not
explain studies that have found no bias when race is not salient-when jurors'
biases should emerge. Second, prior studies introduced the confounding factor
of an interracial crime when making race salient. Finally, and most significant-
ly, prior studies did not measure participants' racism levels. This Part discusses
each limitation, and how the experimental design attempts to address it, in
turn.
Aversive racism theory centers on the hypothesis that white jurors will be
nonbiased when race is made salient but will exhibit biases when race is not sa-
lient. In order to understand why aversive racism theory explains a lack of bias
when race is salient, one must first understand what race salience means. Most
studies have conceptualized race salience to refer to a situation in which "the
nature of the trial emphasizes race as a central issue."27 This conceptualization
ignores more subtle instances of race salience, and this Part addresses this gap
by extending the previous definition. This extension is important for two rea-
sons: (i) it suggests that prior studies that ostensibly contradict aversive racism
theory may actually support the theory; and (2) it provides the impetus for the
debiasing jury instructions in one of the conditions in this Note, as explained
below.
The new conceptualization is as follows: for race to be salient, it need not
be a "central issue" in a trial. Subtle reminders of race can impact juror decision
making: under aversive racism theory, all that matters is that jurors are re-
minded of their egalitarian views before they deliberate. By this new definition,
race salience need not be confined to a central, explicit issue mentioned in the
courtroom; if racial issues are salient in the societal context in which a trial
takes place, this implicit salience should also decrease biases. In fact, there need
27. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 13, at 6o8.
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not even be implicit race salience as long as jurors are reminded of their egali-
tarianism. As a result, this Note posits that egalitarianism -rather than explicit
or implicit race salience-is the central explanatory factor in aversive racism
theory. In other words, race need not be salient to decrease jurors' biases: race
salience, whether implicit or explicit, decreases biases because it reminds aver-
sive racists of their egalitarian views. Because egalitarianism, rather than race
salience, is the causal factor, triggering egalitarianism directly would be simpler
and more powerful. This Part will first examine empirical evidence in support
of the traditional definition of race salience, which I call "explicit race salience."
Then it will examine evidence in favor of the broadened definition of race sali-
ence, which I call "implicit race salience," and I will explain how this new defi-
nition provides the impetus for the jury instructions in this study.
i. Traditional Definition: Explicit Race Salience
According to Samuel Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth, race salience refers
to the idea that race is the "central issue" of a trial. 8 In line with this definition,
Sommers and Ellsworth manipulated race salience in one of their studies in the
following manner: (1) in the "race salience" condition, racially charged lan-
guage was used during the crime or race had motivated the crime itself; and (2)
in the "no race salience" condition, no racially charged language was used nor
had race motivated the crime.29 Sommers and Ellsworth found that white ju-
rors' guilt judgments of black and white defendants did not differ when race
was salient.3" When race was not salient, however, white jurors convicted the
black defendant more often than the white defendant.3" Subsequent studies
have replicated this race-salience effect.' These results support aversive racism
theory; explicit race salience reminds jurors of their egalitarian values, causing
them to suppress their negative feelings toward blacks, and this in turn leads to
equal treatment of black and white defendants. When race is not explicitly sali-
ent, however, white jurors' implicit biases emerge, leading to disparate treat-
ment of white and black defendants. Although many studies have found white
juror bias when race is not explicitly salient, other studies have failed to repli-
28. Id.
29. Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 2, at 1369, 1373.
30. Id. at 1369, 1373-74.
31. Id. at 1374.
32. Cohn et al., supra note 2, at 1961; Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra note 2, at
217.
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cate this effect.33 At first glance, this inconsistency suggests that aversive racism
theory is limited in its scope. However, I will argue that the studies that have
not found white juror bias when race is not explicitly salient have actually cre-
ated implicit race salience. Because implicit salience serves the same function as
explicit race salience in reminding jurors of their egalitarian views, the lack of
white juror bias in those studies may actually support aversive racism theory.
2. New Definition: Implicit Race Salience
I posit that prior literature has discussed implicit race salience in two forms,
though the literature has not framed these discussions in terms of implicit sali-
ence: (1) racial tension in society that is implicitly brought into the courtroom;
and (2) awareness of the race of one's fellow jurors.
a. Race Salience in a Societal Context
A study conducted in Los Angeles during the O.J. Simpson trial by Paul
Skolnick and Jerry Shaw provides evidence for the first type of implicit race sa-
lience: racial tension in society that is implicitly brought into the courtroom.
The researchers presented jurors with a case in which a man was accused of
murdering his ex-wife.' They found that white jurors were equally likely to
convict white and black defendants." Because race was not made explicitly sali-
ent during the trial (the facts of the case insinuated that the man murdered his
wife out of emotional rage with no mention of race or racial motivations),36
these findings, when taken at face value, seem to contradict the aversive racism
theory framework. Although the facts did not mention race, the researchers
claim that racial tensions during the study were high because it was conducted
in Los Angeles during Simpson's civil trial, and the facts in the study were very
similar to Simpson's case. 7
Race salience during pre-trial publicity may lead to white jurors' suppres-
sion of racial biases' 8 In Skolnick and Shaw's experiment, white jurors may
33. E.g., Paul Skolnick & Jerry I. Shaw, The O.J. Simpson Criminal Trial Verdict: Racism or Status
Shield?, 53 J. Soc. ISSUES 503, 513 (1997); see also Samuel PR Sommers, Race and the Decision
Making ofjuries, 12 LEGAL & CRiM. PSYcHOL. 171, 172 (2007).
34. Skolnick & Shaw, supra note 33, at 5o6.
35. Id. at 511.
36. Id. at 506-08.
37. Id. at 514-15.
38. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 13, at 606 (stating that more research needs to be per-
formed to determine the impact of race salience from pre-trial publicity).
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have suppressed their biases because the racially salient social context in Los
Angeles reminded them of their egalitarian views. This link can potentially ex-
plain why whites sometimes act in an nonbiased manner even when race is not
made explicitly salient at a trial: if race is implicitly salient through the societal
context in which the trial takes place, then jurors may act as if race had been
made salient at the trial itself, as either form of salience reminds them of their
egalitarian views.
b. Implicit Race Salience in Racially Diverse Juries
Implicit race salience may also explain why diverse juries become less bi-
ased in their decision making: the race of the minority jurors makes race im-
plicitly salient for white jurors, reminding them of their egalitarianism and
thereby decreasing their biases. In support of this idea, a study found that ma-
jority-white juries were more likely to convict a Hispanic defendant than a
white one, whereas majority-Hispanic juries were equally likely to convict a
Hispanic defendant and a white one.39 These findings support the new defini-
tion of implicit race salience because juries with Hispanic majorities make race
salient for whites, even if race is not an explicit central issue at trial, leading
them to suppress any biases that they may have. In sum, because race is more
salient in majority-Hispanic juries, whites, in accordance with aversive racism,
will act in a less biased manner than in cases in which race is less salient, such
as in majority-white juries. In this respect, the effects of race salience fall along
a continuum: in majority-white juries there are still minorities on the jury, but
not enough to make race as salient as when Hispanics are the majority, leading
to discrepant outcomes between the two juries.
An alternative explanation is that white jurors' biases may not have
changed; the discrepant outcomes between majority-Hispanic and majority-
white juries may instead be caused by a shift in power on the jury. One could
argue that the majority-Hispanic jury was nonbiased because those in power
were nonbiased, and thus their opinions were discussed more often. Likewise,
on the majority-white jury, there were more advocates for a biased opinion,
leading to a more polarized and biased decision.
Although this power hypothesis is a plausible explanation, group polariza-
tion based on power structure alone cannot account for the different verdicts of
majority-Hispanic and majority-white juries. Pre-deliberation attitudes among
whites become less biased when they expect to sit on racially heterogeneous ju-
39. Dolores Perez et al., Ethnicity of Defendants and Jurors as Influences on jury Decisions, 23 J. AP-
PLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1229, 1256 (1993).
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ries,40 and this suppressed bias then leads whites to discuss different issues
than when they are on homogeneous juries.41 Samuel Sommers compared the
pre-deliberation attitudes, deliberation content, and verdicts of homogenous
all-white juries and heterogeneous white-and-black juries. 4 He found that
when whites were told that they would serve on a heterogeneous jury, they
were significantly less likely to think that the black defendant was guilty than
were white jurors who were told they would serve on a homogeneous all-white
jury.43 In addition, researchers have found that whites anticipating serving on
racially diverse juries are more attuned to race-related concepts; they complete
word-stem completion tasks with more race-related words than do those antic-
ipating serving on homogeneous juries. 4 The expectation of serving on a ra-
cially diverse jury may therefore act as a form of implicit race salience that re-
minds whites of their egalitarian views and inhibits their negative feelings
toward blacks. This implicit salience then leads whites to discuss different is-
sues than when they serve on homogeneous juries.4'
Anticipating serving on racially diverse juries also leads to more in-depth
processing of race-relevant information and the suppression of biases. White
jurors expecting to interact in racially diverse groups perform better on reading
comprehension tests that contain race-relevant questions than whites expecting
to interact in all-white groups. 46 Sommers conducted an experiment that in-
structed white participants that they would discuss either a race-neutral topic -
gay marriage - or a race-relevant topic - affirmative action - in either an all-
40. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Ef-
fects of Racial Composition on jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 607
(2006) (finding that diverse groups were less likely to deem the black defendant guilty than
all-white groups).
41. Id. at 604-06 (finding that diverse groups discussed more facts, evidence that was missing,
and race-related concepts than all-white groups).
42. Id. at 603.
43. Id.
44. Samuel R. Sommers et al., Cognitive Effects of Racial Diversity: White Individuals' Information
Processing in Heterogeneous Groups, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1129, 1133 (20o8).
Word-stem completion tasks are those in which a participant is given the beginning of a
word, followed by a certain number of blank spaces, and is asked to complete the word. See,
e.g., Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Perfor-
mance ofAfrican Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 803 (1995). Completing
a stem-completion task with race-related words means that an individual fills in an ambigu-
ous stem with a term related to race. See id. For example, "_ _ ACK" could be filled out in
multiple ways, such as SMACK, which is race-neutral, or BLACK, which is race-related. Id.
For more examples, see id.
45. Sommers, supra note 40 at 604-06.
46. Sommers et al., supra note 44, at 1133.
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white or racially diverse group.47 The participants never actually discussed the
topic in a group, but were led to believe they would.48 Before reading back-
ground material on the subject, but after knowing the topic to which they were
assigned, participants individually completed a word-stem completion task.49
Participants then read background material on their topic and were given a
reading comprehension test.s"
Sommers found that the white participants expecting to discuss a race-
relevant topic with a racially diverse group completed word-stems with more
racial terms, suggesting that race was more accessible"1 and salient for them.
Sommers also found that this increased salience led to better performance on
the reading comprehension test. 2 In other words, the influence of racial diver-
sity on reading comprehension is mediated by race salience; race salience ex-
plains why those expecting to interact in racially diverse groups process infor-
mation better. 3 In addition, although those expecting to discuss a race-relevant
topic completed word-stems with more race-related terms, they completed
fewer word-stems with stereotypical terms-such as "poor," "drugs," and
"crime" 54 - suggesting that this race salience suppressed their biases. This find-
ing supports the aversive racism theory framework in that race salience leads to
both better information processing for whites (as measured by better perfor-
mance on the reading comprehension test) and the suppression of biases. In
the legal context, discussing the guilt of a black defendant with a racially di-
verse jury is analogous to discussing a race-relevant topic, which should lead to
better information processing and fewer biases among white jurors.
The juries in another of Sommers's studies, though racially diverse, were
majority-white, so the results of this study seem to be in tension with the re-
sults of the majority-white juries in the study of Dolores Perez and others.
Sommers's study found that whites in heterogeneous majority-white juries
were nonbiased," whereas Perez's study found that whites in heterogeneous
majority-white juries were more likely to convict a Hispanic than a white de-
fendant. 6 These results seem contradictory, but two differences between the
47- Id. at 1132.
48. Id. at 1131.






55. Sommers, supra note 40, at 604-05.
56. Perez et al., supra note 39, at 1256.
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studies suggest that they may in fact be compatible. First, Sommers's study did
not manipulate defendant race: the defendant was always black." Therefore,
one cannot state conclusively that the juries were less biased toward a black de-
fendant than a white defendant; all that can be concluded is that heterogeneous
juries are significantly less likely to convict a black defendant than are homoge-
neous juries. Second, Sommers compared the juries to each other s8 whereas
Perez and colleagues compared the ratings of each Hispanic or white defend-
ant's guilt within each jury, and then compared the differential findings be-
tween the juries.5 9 Therefore, it is possible that the heterogeneous jury in
Sommers's study, although relatively nonbiased against a black defendant as
compared to the all-white jury, may still have treated a white defendant more
leniently than a black defendant. That result would fit with the finding that
heterogeneous majority-white juries are more biased against minority defend-
ants than against white defendants.6 '
3. Race Salience in this Note
Because, as I have argued, implicit race salience likely suppresses white ju-
ror biases, the present research makes race salient in two different ways. This
approach tests whether empirical data support my hypothesis about implicit
race salience, and, if so, whether my hypothesis can be used to combat juror bi-
ases in the form of debiasing jury instructions. It also employs the traditional
definition of explicit race salience to attempt to replicate past results and to ad-
dress the second shortcoming of the literature: the confounding factor of inter-
racial crime. I will first outline the conceptualization of implicit race sali-
ence in this experiment, followed by the conceptualization of explicit race
salience.
57. Sommers, supra note 40, at 602.
58. Id. at 603-o6.
5g. Perez et al., supra note 39, at 1256.
60. Sommers, supra note 40, at 603-04.
61. Perez et al., supra note 39, at 1256. Note that the two studies are not perfectly comparable
because white jurors may treat Hispanic individuals differently from black individuals. The
aversive racism theory framework is typically applied to whites' interactions with blacks be-
cause of whites' guilt over historical racism against blacks; whites compensate by attempting
to treat blacks fairly. Thus, the result that heterogeneous majority-white juries are more le-
nient toward white than Hispanic defendants may not generalize to heterogeneous majority-
white juries faced with white defendants in one condition and black defendants in another.
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a. Conceptualization of Implicit Race Salience
This Note expands on the idea that race salience can function implicitly and
lead to aversive racists' equal judgments of guilt for white and black defend-
ants. Both Skolnick and Shaw's study and the jury studies demonstrate that
race need not be explicitly invoked in a trial for it to be salient. In these studies,
whites are implicitly aware of race, and this implicit awareness reminds them
of their egalitarianism, a process that in turn leads to the suppression of their
biases. Expanding the definition of race salience not only strengthens support
for aversive racism theory by suggesting that Skolnick and Shaw's study may
support the theory but also suggests that explicit race salience is not necessary
to decrease juror biases. In both the traditional definition of race salience as ex-
plicit and the expanded implicit definition, salience reduces biases because it
reminds jurors of their egalitarian views. So egalitarianism, regardless of the
definition employed, seems to be the driving force for reducing biases. Explicit
and implicit race salience are sufficient, but not necessary, to reduce biases; bi-
ases are reduced even when one or both types of salience are absent, whereas
egalitarianism is necessary to reduce biases in both instances.
This conceptualization motivates the jury instructions derived from aver-
sive racism theory in this Note: instructions that prime egalitarianism, even
without mentioning race, should decrease juror biases. It is important to trig-
ger egalitarianism directly, as not every trial has implicit or explicit race sali-
ence. Therefore, jury instructions that are derived from egalitarianism should
lower biases against black defendants, even if the jury is homogenously white
and there is no implicit societal race salience and no explicit race salience. Such
instructions would be a potentially powerful tool for reducing prejudice.
b. Conceptualization of Explicit Race Salience
In addition to basing jury instructions on egalitarianism, the study also
employs the standard definition of explicit race salience to (1) replicate prior
findings and (2) determine whether egalitarianism and explicit race salience are
additive, such that having both egalitarianism and explicit race salience might
decrease biases more than either does on its own. The manipulation of explicit
race salience draws on the traditional definition of race salience, in which race
is a central element of the crime,62 such that race is a central element of the
crime or race had motivated the crime itself.6, In line with this definition, in
this Note, race was mentioned during the commission of the crime by a by-
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62. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 13, at 6o8.
63. Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 2, at 1369, 1373.
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stander complaining about an increase in crimes committed by blacks. In this
sense, race was featured prominently in the description of the crime. However,
this approach departs from the traditional definition of explicit race salience.
Traditionally, race motivated the crime, such that the defendant or victim made
racist remarks.6' In this study, race is not the impetus for the crime. Rather, a
neutral bystander mentions race. This conceptualization of race salience was
chosen for two reasons: (1) to eliminate an alternative explanation for any pos-
sible results, namely the idea that participants' judgments reflected hostility
toward the black victim/defendant as a function of ingroup pride rather than
prejudice against the black victim/defendant; and (2) to eliminate the alterna-
tive explanation that an interaction between the victim and defendant's race
produced the results rather than the defendant's race alone.
One problem with prior studies is that, in the crime scenarios, racial re-
marks were exchanged between the victim and the defendant, and the victim
was either white or black and the defendant was the opposite race.6s If this
Note conceptualized race salience this way and bias were found against the
black defendant, it could plausibly be explained by social identity theory. It is
quite possible that, for example, white participants might judge black defend-
ants more harshly than white defendants because they feel their self-worth as
white individuals is affronted when a black victim's racial insults cause a white
defendant to commit a crime, or when a black defendant yells racial insults at a
white victim. In other words, white participants may excuse the white defend-
ant's actions based on their anger toward the black victim for inciting violence
through racial slurs, or they may want to punish the black defendant more
harshly for being racist toward a white victim. In this respect, white jurors may
see the black victim's or defendant's racist comments against whites as person-
ally attacking them, thereby affecting their guilt judgments. In fact, this is con-
sistent with social identity theory. Whites may be more lenient toward white
defendants because of ingroup pride; the black victim's or defendant's racist
comments may wound their self-esteem, leading to comparatively lenient
judgments of the white defendant as a means of raising ingroup status and re-
storing self-esteem.
This is just one example of how both aversive racism theory and social
identity theory can plausibly explain why white jurors are more likely to find
black defendants guilty than white defendants. Participants may be more leni-
ent toward a white defendant because the black victim threatened their ingroup
self-esteem through his racist comments, or they may be harsher toward a
black defendant because of implicit prejudice. In other words, although many
64. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 13, at 603.
65. E.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 2, at 1372-73.
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past studies have shown that explicit race salience leads to the suppression of
biases, it may lead to the suppression of biases only when a crime is interracial.
Therefore, whether explicit race salience itself leads to the suppression of biases
is unknown, and this Note was designed to test this idea. To minimize the im-
pact of the confounding variable of an interracial crime, this Note employed a
bystander who mentions race so that participants' judgments of the defendant
would not be affected by any animosity toward the victim. Further, if racial
hostility motivated the defendant to commit the crime, then the confounding
variable of an interracial crime would remain, as it would be unusual for a de-
fendant to commit a racially motivated crime against someone of his own race.
By keeping the racial element out of the crime, the racial identity of the victim
can be concealed. As a result, any difference in guilt judgments can be attribut-
ed to the race of the defendant rather than to any sort of interaction between
the defendant's race and the victim's race.
Before turning to social identity theory, one last component of aversive rac-
ism theory will be explained: aversive racists will only exhibit bias if the evi-
dence against the defendant is ambiguous.
4. Ambiguity: Why a Lack of Race Salience Causes Juror Biases
The studies discussed in this Note suggest that when race is not explicit,
white jurors are not aware of their biases and hence do not try to suppress
them, which results in biased decision making. Significantly, however, a lack of
race salience seems to result in biases only when evidence concerning the de-
66fendant's guilt is ambiguous. In one study, for example, the eyewitness's
credibility was suspect, and there was doubt as to the defendant's whereabouts
when the murder took place, so his guilt was uncertain. 6' According to aversive
racism theory, when there are "nonracial factors in interracial situations, whites
may discriminate against blacks and still perceive themselves as being nonprej-
udiced and egalitarian." 68 In addition to the legal context, this effect has been
documented in a variety of contexts." 9 In the face of conflicting evidence (a
66. E.g., Ugwuegbu, supra note 2, at 139-40.
67. Skolnick & Shaw, supra note 33, at 507-08.
68. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 8, at 73.
69. Christopher L. Aberson & Tara E. Ettlin, The Aversive Racism Paradigm and Responses Favor-
ing African Americans: Meta-Analytic Evidence of Two Types of Favoritism, 17 Soc. JUST. RES.
25, 33, 35 (2004) (conducting a meta-analysis of various studies, including those analyzing
helping behavior, medical patient relations, and employment hiring decisions, and finding
that when norms were ambiguous, whites favored whites over blacks, but this did not occur
when there was no ambiguity). A meta-analysis is an aggregation of multiple studies to dis-
cern broad patterns in the results. See also John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive
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nonracial factor), whites rely more strongly on evidence that incriminates a
black defendant, using the ambiguity of the evidence to justify to themselves
that they are not being racist. If evidence of innocence were strong, they would
not be able to adequately rationalize their bias and would have to suppress this
bias. In this respect, whites do not always show bias against blacks; bias is acti-
vated only when evidence is ambiguous.
Strength of evidence is a good proxy for ambiguity, as evidence that is
questionable is interpreted as ambiguous. Most studies that have found white
juror bias have presented ambiguous evidence against the defendant, but these
studies did not manipulate the strength of evidence, 70 so one cannot compare
across conditions of strong, weak, and ambiguous evidence to determine
whether biases only occur when evidence is ambiguous. Fortunately, one study
did just that: the evidence was nonexistent, strong, or marginal/ambiguous
depending on the condition." The study found that white jurors rated a black
defendant's and white defendant's culpability equally if the evidence was
strong or weak; when evidence was marginal/ambiguous, on the other hand,
white jurors rated the black defendant as more culpable than the white defend-
ant.' This study provides empirical support for the idea that biases emerge on-
ly when evidence is ambiguous. White jurors likely attribute their harsher
treatment of blacks to nonracial factors; for example, they may focus more on
evidence that incriminates the black defendant than on evidence that exoner-
ates him. When evidence is strong or weak and hence largely points in one di-
rection, jurors cannot use nonracial factors to justify a biased decision. As a re-
sult, for this Note, evidence was purposefully ambiguous in order to test
aversive racism theory.
As an added bonus, having ambiguous evidence more accurately mirrors
real-life trials. In practice, if evidence against the defendant is strong, the de-
fense attorney will often seek a plea bargain, and if evidence is weak, the prose-
cutor will often seek a plea bargain. Generally, many of the cases that go to trial
are those in which both the prosecutor and defense attorney believe that the ev-
idence is ambiguous.
In sum, the aversive racism theory framework is powerful. It explains why
explicit and implicit race salience lead white jurors to treat white and black de-
Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCl. 315, 317 (2000) (finding that
when candidate qualifications were ambiguous, black candidates were recommended for a
job significantly less strongly than white candidates).
70. See, e.g., Cohn et al., supra note 2, at 1958-59; Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom,
supra note 2, at 1368-69, 1372-73; Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra note 2, at
214-15.
71. Ugwuegbu, supra note 2, at 137.
72. Id. at 139.
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fendants equally. When race is salient, whether explicitly or implicitly, whites
attempt to compensate for their implicit negative feelings toward blacks by
suppressing their biases. When race is not salient, and evidence is ambiguous,
white jurors' implicit biases emerge, leading to leniency toward white over
black defendants. However, social identity theory can just as easily explain
white juror biases.
B. Social Identity Theory
As previously mentioned, most scholars have attributed juror biases to
aversive racism theory. This Note contends, however, that the results of their
studies are also compatible with social identity theory, and therefore it is cru-
cial to test whether social identity theory or aversive racism theory better ex-
plains juror biases. Teasing apart these two explanations will not only improve
our theoretical understanding of the psychological origins of juror biases, but
the two explanations also lead to divergent implications for how to combat bi-
ases in the courtroom.
According to social identity theory, individuals express favoritism toward
ingroup members, "satisfying their need for positive self-esteem"; they want
their ingroup members to be treated well so as to reflect positively on them73
In accordance with social identity theory, it is possible that white jurors favor
their own race because they wish to increase their own self-esteem. However,
one could also argue that, rather than white ingroup favoritism, white jurors'
leniency toward white defendants may actually be due to jurors' racially preju-
diced stereotyping of blacks; this is what aversive racism theory would predict.
However, a phenomenon called the "black sheep effect" calls into question the
possibility that aversive racism theory explains juror biases. According to this
effect, individuals actually disfavor their ingroup under certain conditions.
When ingroup members act in an objectionable manner, they are often per-
ceived more negatively than outgroup members who act in similar ways. 4 In-
group members separate themselves from the individual in order to maintain a
positive group image. 7s To test the black sheep effect, Jan-Willem van Prooijen
conducted a study that manipulated guilt probability (certain, uncertain) and
73. Miles Hewstone et al., Intergroup Bias, S3 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 575, 580 (2002).
74. Jos6 M. Marques et al., The "Black Sheep Effect": Extremity of Judgments Toward Ingroup
Members as a Function of Group Identification, 18 EuR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 12 (1988).
75. See id. at 5.
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social categorization (ingroup, outgroup).76 The results show that guilt proba-
bility moderates the ingroup bias effect: participants were more punitive to-
ward ingroup members when the guilt of the ingroup member was certain, but
were more punitive toward outgroup members when guilt was uncertain.77
The fact that ingroup jurors are more likely to convict an ingroup defend-
ant when evidence is strong underscores the importance of social identity theo-
ry in guilt judgments. If racial stereotypes alone drove jurors' decisions, then
jurors would not be more punitive toward ingroup members when evidence
was strong. Social identity theory explains the black sheep effect well: jurors
try to distance a clearly guilty ingroup member as an outlier by acting more
punitively toward him. By designating the guilty ingroup member as an out-
cast, ingroup members seek to maintain a positive image of the rest of the in-
group and by extension preserve their self-esteem.7
8
To summarize, whites use ingroup bias to enhance their group's status as
long as the evidence is ambiguous, or at least does not strongly incriminate an
ingroup member. Although it seems likely that social identity theory explains
this phenomenon, it is only a post hoc explanation. Research suggests a few
ways to evaluate whether social identity theory explains decision making by
testing the link between ingroup bias and self-esteem. If an individual's need
for self-esteem fuels ingroup bias, then bias toward the ingroup should in-
crease self-esteem, or low self-esteem should cause ingroup bias.79 A meta-
analysis has supported the idea that ingroup bias increases self-esteem,s ° but
little evidence has supported the idea that low self-esteem leads to ingroup bi-
81
as.
Considering the fact that ingroup bias increases self-esteem, if self-esteem
is sufficiently high before jurors are asked to make a decision regarding guilt,
then jurors will not be motivated to rely on ingroup bias. Indeed, social identi-
76. Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Retributive Reactions to Suspected Offenders: The Importance of Social
Categorizations and Guilt Probability, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 715, 718, 720,
723 (2006).
77. Id. at 725.
78. Van Prooijen's study did not specifically investigate jurors' racial biases. It investigated bias
due to national origin and other affiliations, id. at 718, 720, 723, suggesting the need to repli-
cate the effect with whites and blacks.
79. See Hewstone et al., supra note 73, at 58o.
8o. P.J. Oakes & J.C. Turner, Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour: Does Minimal Inter-
group Discrimination Make Social Identity Theory More Positive?, lo EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 295,
299-300 (198o) (finding that intergroup discrimination increases self-esteem and dismiss-
ing alternative hypotheses).
81. Hewstone et al., supra note 73, at 58o.
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ty theory implicates temporary self-esteem.2 A meta-analysis found support
for the hypothesis that temporary self-esteem, but not long-term self-esteem, is
related to discrimination against outgroups. 8' The researchers suggest that low
temporary self-esteem can lead to discrimination against outgroups in order to
increase this self-esteem. 8' This Note tests this inference through jury instruc-
tions derived from social identity theory. If whites make decisions that discrim-
inate against an outgroup to increase their temporary self-esteem, then jury in-
structions that preemptively and temporarily increase jurors' feelings of self-
worth should reduce this bias. I term these instructions self-affirming jury in-
structions.
In the self-affirming instructions, participants were instructed to think
about their positive attributes in order to increase their self-esteem. 8s Though
studies generally induce self-affirmation through writing exercises rather than
thinking exercises,86 some have asked participants "to use imagery techniques
or think about their positive qualities.87 I decided to pursue a thinking exercise
to temporarily raise self-esteem rather than a writing exercise for three reasons.
First, prior research has revealed that thinking exercises produce the intended
effect by temporarily altering mood.88 Second, if I had induced self-affirmation
through a writing task, the manipulation would not be contained within the
jury instructions, and this would risk introducing a confounding variable.
Third, a thinking exercise requires less deviation from the current judicial pro-
cedures regarding jury instructions. As a result, judges may be more willing to
insert self-affirmation elements into jury instructions than to have jurors brain-
storm and write about their positive attributes in the middle of jury instruc-
tions.
82. See Mark Rubin & Miles Hewstone, Social Identity Theory's Self-Esteem Hypothesis: A Review
and Some Suggestions for Clarification, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 40, 42 (1998)
(discussing the distinction between "trait" self-esteem, which is more permanent, and
"state" self-esteem, which is temporary).
83. See id. at 56-57.
84. See id. at 58.
85. See discussion infra Part LV.B.
86. See, e.g., Amy McQueen & William M.P. Klein, Experimental Manipulations of Self-
Affirmation: A Systematic Review, 5 SELF & IDENTITY 289, 295-97 (20o6) (discussing the types
of manipulations used in self-affirmation studies: writing tasks in which participants de-
scribe positive experiences, value essays in which participants write about values important
to them, and value scales in which participants select values important to them from a list).
87. Id. at 295.
88. Joanne V. Wood et al., This Mood Is Familiar and I Don't Deserve To Feel Better Anyway:
Mechanisms Underlying Self-Esteem Differences in Motivation To Repair Sad Moods, 96 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 363, 366 (2009).
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III. HYPOTHESES
A. Aversive Racism Theory Versus Social Identity Theory
Both aversive racism theory and social identity theory can plausibly explain
previous findings about biases when evidence is ambiguous; both theories rely
on the idea that evidence must be ambiguous for biases to emerge. More spe-
cifically, according to social identity theory, evidence must be ambiguous and
cannot be strongly incriminating, or else jurors would show a black sheep ef-
fect and act more punitively toward the ingroup defendant. According to aver-
sive racism theory, evidence must be ambiguous so that whites have a nonracial
excuse - the ambiguity of the evidence - to rationalize their relative harshness
toward black defendants. Based on prior research and the theoretical under-
pinnings of aversive racism theory and social identity theory, I formulated the
following set of predictions for each theory. These hypotheses are confined to
each theory and do not relate to the issue of which theory is more likely to ex-
plain white juror biases.
If aversive racism theory explains juror biases, then participants should be
more likely to find black defendants guilty when explicit race salience is low as
opposed to high and when there are no jury instructions as compared to when
there are egalitarian instructions. Further, one of the deficiencies in the current
literature is that participants' levels of implicit and explicit racism were not
measured. This is a significant gap in the literature because aversive racism
theory relies on whites' possession of high implicit and low explicit racism, but
there are also whites that have both high implicit and high explicit racism (true
racists) and those who have both low implicit and low explicit racism (non-
racists). Therefore, past results cannot accurately be attributed to aversive rac-
ism theory because those tested were not necessarily aversive racists. As a re-
sult, this Note measured participants' implicit and explicit racism scores so that
participants could be split into three groups: true racists, aversive racists, and
non-racists.
If aversive racism theory explains white juror biases, then the level of ex-
plicit salience and whether there are egalitarian instructions should affect only
aversive racists. True racists will be racist even when explicit salience is high
and there are egalitarian instructions, because they do not have egalitarian
views due to their high explicit racism. Non-racists do not have these biases, so
even when explicit salience is low and there are no instructions, they should
not exhibit biases. This Note also examines whether the combination of egali-
tarian instructions and high explicit race salience might decrease judgments of
guilt by aversive racists more than either factor on its own.
Social identity theory would predict the following set of results. First, the
results should be the opposite of those for aversive racism theory; namely, par-
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ticipants should judge the black defendant to be guiltier when explicit salience
is high than when it is low, and this should not depend on racism level, as so-
cial identity theory applies to all whites.8 The more salient race is, the more
one identifies with one's ingroup and the more likely one is to derogate an out-
group member in order to increase self-esteem. In addition, the black defend-
ant should be judged to be guiltier when there are no instructions compared to
the situation in which there are self-affirming instructions. Self-affirming in-
structions should also reduce any differences in guilt based on explicit race sali-
ence by increasing participants' sense of self-worth so that they will not need to
discriminate against the black defendant regardless of whether salience is high
or low.
B. Procedural Justice
In addition to testing whether theories that specifically deal with race can
decrease biases, this Note examines whether procedural justice, a race-neutral
theory, can combat biases. If so, this theory could eliminate the need to make
race salient in order to decrease racism.
Procedural justice, as noted above, suggests that when individuals experi-
ence fair decision-making procedures, they view the law as more legitimate.9"
This legitimacy then leads to compliance with legal rules.9' Procedural justice is
defined by four issues,9 2 all of which shaped the jury instructions in this study.
First, individuals want to have a voice and share their side of a story.93 In line
89. Because social identity theory is based on ingroup pride, all members of the ingroup have
the motivation to raise the status of the ingroup, and this does not depend on racism level.
Thus, unlike aversive racism theory, social identity theory does not predict that levels of im-
plicit and explicit racism will differentially affect guilt judgments. In addition, the race-
salience prediction seems to contradict past research showing that high race salience leads to
equal judgments of guilt for white and black defendants. See sources cited supra note 2.
However, as mentioned earlier, the results were confounded by the interracial nature of the
crimes committed, so the issue of whether high race salience leads to equalization of judg-
ments in accordance with aversive racism theory is unclear. See supra Part II.A.3. Therefore,
this Note eliminated this confounding variable to determine whether high race salience
leads to equal guilt judgments (in line with aversive racism theory), or whether, without an
interracial crime, high race salience leads to ingroup identification and biased judgments (in
line with social identity theory).
go. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 5 (20o6).
91. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST.
283, 306 (2003).
92. Tom Tyler et al., What Motivates Adherence to Medical Recommendations? The Procedural Jus-
tice Approach to Gaining Deference in the Medical Arena, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 350, 351
(2014).
93. Id.
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with this idea, the jury instructions used to test this theory told participants to
consider all facts. This comports with the idea of voice, as it allowed both sides'
stories, the defense's and the prosecution's, to be heard. Second, procedural
justice requires unbiased decision makers.94 For instance, studies have shown
that the police are viewed as more legitimate if they exercise authority through
fair and impartial means. 95 The instructions primed jurors' sense of impartiali-
ty to encourage them to view the juror decision-making process as more legit-
imate, and as a result, to be unbiased in determining guilt or innocence. Third,
individuals want to be treated with civility and dignity. 96 And fourth, individu-
als want their authority figures to be trustworthy. 97 In line with these final two
issues, the jury instructions primed the importance of treating the defendant
with respect. It was predicted that jury instructions based on procedural justice
would lower biases for all participants, as participants would view their deci-
sion-making process as fair and, in turn, comply with the ideal of impartiality
in juror decision making.
Research suggests that procedural justice effects can produce long-lasting
changes in behavior. For example, one group of researchers found that the per-
ceived fairness of a mediated session predicted compliance with the mediated
agreement up to eight months later. 9s In this study, pairs participated in dis-
pute mediation.99 During the mediation, the mediator told the participants
that he would be neutral and that the disputants would get to tell their sides of
the story.' After the mediation, participants were asked questions that tapped
into the construct of procedural justice. Namely, they were asked how fair the
mediation procedure was, whether they thought their voice was heard, and
whether the mediator understood what they had to say.' As procedural justice
theory would predict, when respondents viewed the mediation as fair, they
were more likely to comply with the terms of the mediated agreement, accord-
94. Id.
9s. See Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply with the Law? Legitimacy and the Influence
of Legal Institutions, 52 BRiT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051, io6o (2012); see also Sunshine & Tyler,
supra note 25, at 535 (stating that procedural justice in policing causes the police to be viewed
as legitimate).
96. Tom Tyler et al., supra note 92, at 351.
97. Id.
98. Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 324-26
(1993).
99. Id. at 316.
1o. Id. at 317.
1o1. Id. at 318-19.
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ing to claimants." 2 Similarly, if jury instructions primed fairness and individu-
als view the juror decision-making process as fair, participants should comply
with the process requiring them to render unbiased verdicts.
C. Timing of Instructions
This Note also examines when debiasing instructions have the greatest ef-
fect in reducing biases. Differences in guilt judgment based on timing will help
suggest when debiasing instructions should be given to juries in actual trials.
Currently, juries in criminal trials generally receive the bulk of jury instructions
after they hear evidence." 3 At that point, jurors have already formed opinions
about the case, 04 and it is very difficult to change their perceptions. Instruc-
tions presented before evidence are likely more effective at combatting biases
than instructions presented after evidence for two reasons.
First, instructions presented before evidence will help jurors to focus on
and recall relevant evidence rather than irrelevant evidence' such as race. Se-
cond, placing jury instructions before the presentation of evidence can provide
jurors with a framework for evaluating evidence. Research has shown that in-
dividuals are more able to recognize primed information when they have an
organizational schema that provides them with context to evaluate the evi-
dence."6 Pre-evidence instructions would provide the jury with an organiza-
tional framework for evaluating evidence. If the instructions are also debiasing,
they will prime jurors to organize the evidence according to legal principles ra-
ther than personal biases.
Despite theoretical support for pre-evidence instructions,0 7 empirical re-
search has been mixed. On the one hand, some research has found that giving
jury instructions before rather than after the evidence results in better recall of
102. Id. at 324.
103. E.g., Christian Sheehan, Making the Jurors the "Experts": The Case for Eyewitness Identification
Juty Instructions, 52 B.C. L. REv. 651, 681-82 (2011). But see, e.g., ARIz. R. CRm. P. 18.6(c)
("Immediately after the jury is sworn, the court shall instruct the jury concerning its duties,
its conduct... and the elementary legal principles that will govern the proceeding.").
104. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 104-17, 375-80 (1966).
1oS. E.g., Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 163,177 (1977).
io6. E.g., John D. Bransford & Marcia K. Johnson, Contextual Prerequisites for Understanding:
Some Investigations of Comprehension and Recall, ii J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 717,
724 (1972).
107. See supra text accompanying notes lO5-1o6.
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the instructions, , 8 lower conviction rates,'0 9 deferral of determining a defend-
ant's guilt and thus not jumping to a conclusion until after all the evidence has
been presented,"1 and appropriate distinctions among plaintiffs who have dif-
ferent levels of deservingness in a civil trial."' Yet other research has found that
presenting the jury instructions earlier does not affect verdicts," 2 interpreta-
tions of the reasonable doubt standard,"3 or evaluations of the strength of evi-
dence. 1 1
4
Although the empirical results are mixed, these studies examined legally
substantive jury instructions, or instructions that explain legal standards,
which may be less comprehensible than debiasing jury instructions. Many
studies have shown that individuals have difficulty comprehending substantive
legal instructions,"' whereas the debiasing instructions in this Note do not
contain legal standards",6 and are arguably simpler and easier to understand.
Timing should have less of an effect if jurors do not understand the instruc-
tions, as they cannot form a framework within which to evaluate evidence re-
gardless of when the instructions are presented. Because the debiasing instruc-
tions do not involve complex legal principles, timing should have a stronger
effect: the jurors will be able to understand the instructions, and therefore they
lo3. Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with Written and Pre-
liminary Instructions, 13 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 409, 424-25 (1989) (reporting a marginally sig-
nificant effect for recall of instructions in criminal, but not civil, trials).
log. One study suggests that preliminary instructions affect judgments of guilt, whereas post-
evidence instructions have no effect on guilt judgments, functioning as if no instructions
had been given. See Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, On the Requirements of
Proof. The Timing of Judicial Instruction and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1877, 1882 (1979) (finding that preliminary instructions led to forty-one percent
guilty verdicts whereas no instructions and post-evidence instructions both led to eighty-
two percent guilty verdicts).
11o. Vicki L. Smith, Impact of Pretrial Instruction on Jurors' Information Processing and Decision
Making, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 220, 225 (1991).
iii. Lynne ForsterLee et al., Juror Competence in Civil Trials: Effects of Preinstruction and Evidence
Technicality, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 14, 19 (1993).
112. Donna Cruse & Beverly A. Browne, Reasoning in a Jury Trial: The Influence of Instructions, 114
J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 129, 131 (1987); Smith, supra note 11o, at 225.
113. Kassin &Wrightsman, supra note 109, at 1881.
114. Id.
11S. See, e.g., V. Gordon Rose & James R.P. Ogloff, Evaluating the Comprehensibility of Jury In-
structions: A Method and an Example, 25 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 409,427 (2001); see also Amy E.
Smith & Craig Haney, Getting to the Point: Attempting To Improve Juror Comprehension of
Capital Penalty Phase Instructions, 35 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 339, 346 (2011) (finding that on av-
erage, participants answered more than half the questions regarding the categorization of
aggravating and mitigating factors incorrectly).
116. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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can use the debiasing framework as they evaluate evidence. Finally, the mixed
results of timing for legally substantive instructions suggest that timing has at
least some effect even when comprehensibility is low, or else some studies
would not have found a beneficial effect from pre-evidence instructions. There-
fore, more comprehensible instructions should lead to results that provide
stronger support for the timing hypothesis. It was thus predicted that debi-
asing instructions presented before evidence would decrease guilt judgments of
the black defendant more than debiasing instructions presented after evidence.
IV. METHOD
A. Participants
Four hundred and twelve Amazon Mechanical Turk117 participants com-
pleted the study, 175 of whom were male./' 8 There were 26 Asian/Asian Ameri-
cans, 30 Latino/Hispanic Americans, 35 Black/African Americans, 16 Na-
tive/American Indians, 333 White/European Americans, and 6 Other
participants. 9 They ranged in age from 18 to 75, and the median age was 32.
Participants were restricted to those whose location was the United States and
117. Amazon Mechanical Turk is a website where social science researchers post experiments and
participants complete them in exchange for pay. Though relatively new, it is considered "a
viable alternative for data collection." Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 417 (2010). Although there is
some concern that Mechanical Turk workers have repeat exposure to standard study
measures and thus respond in a more accurate manner, see, e.g., Jesse Chandler et al.,
Nonnaivete Among Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers: Consequences and Solutionsfor Behavior-
al Researchers, 46 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 112, 120 (2013), this concern is not likely to be a
limitation of this experiment. There are very few Mechanical Turk studies that use the Im-
plicit Association Test (LAT) because of the difficulty of measuring reaction time on Qual-
trics, so it is unlikely that respondents have been repeatedly exposed to these measures. Fur-
ther, participants cannot control their responses on the IAT, see discussion infra Part IV.C,
which would prevent them from responding in a more accurate manner even if they had
previously been exposed to the measure.
118. This gender balance, in which 57.52% of the sample is female, is typical of Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk samples generally, in which 64.85% of the worker population is female. Paolacci et
al., supra note 117, at 412. In fact, the sample in this Note is even more representative of the
general population than the typical Amazon Mechanical Turk sample, and Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk samples are already more representative of the U.S. population than axe other in-
ternet samples and college undergraduate samples. Id. at 414.
i19. Some participants selected that they were multiple races, which explains why the numbers
for the race demographics add up to more than 412. Because Amazon Mechanical Turk does
not allow for restriction of a sample based on race, the sample consisted of multiple races ra-
ther than only white participants. See infra Part VI.D.i for a discussion of how this limits the
results.
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who had an approval rate of 95% or more for previous work assignments. 2 °
The participants were paid $1. lo for fifteen minutes of participation.
B. Design
The experiment employed a 4 x 2 X 2 x 3 between-subjects design. The in-
dependent variables were content of instructions (egalitarian, self-affirming,
procedural justice, none); timing of instructions (pre-evidence, post-evidence);
explicit race salience (high, low); and racism category of the participant (non-
racist, aversive racist, true racist). In all conditions, the defendant was black.
For the independent variable of content of instructions, in all conditions
the participants were instructed on the reasonable doubt standard in determin-
ing guilt. The instructions consisted of a page of text with two to four para-
graphs depending on the condition, and were presented in bold typeface. In
the egalitarian condition, participants read jury instructions that primed egali-
tarian views. Specifically, they were instructed:
Whatever your verdict may be, it must not rest upon baseless specula-
tions. Nor may it be influenced in any way by bias, prejudice, or sym-
pathy. Research has shown that some individuals have unconscious bi-
ases that affect their judgments, so please monitor any such biases you
may have and do not let them affect your judgments.
In the self-affirming condition, participants read instructions that affirmed
their self-worth. Specifically, they were instructed:
Our system greatly respects jurors' abilities to evaluate evidence and re-
turn just verdicts. Studies have shown that jurors thoughtfully and
carefully examine evidence, especially if they think of their own positive
attributes and experiences before considering the evidence. In light of
this research, please take a moment to think about your own positive
attributes and experiences. Now that you have reflected on your own
positive attributes and experiences, I have full confidence that you will
consider the evidence carefully and render an appropriate decision.
In the procedural justice condition, participants read instructions that primed
the importance of using fair procedures. Specifically, they were instructed:
12o. Before accepting work from a participant, the individual running the study can decide
whether to accept or reject the participant's work. See Amazon Mechanical Turk FAQ, AMA-
ZON, http://aws.amazon.com/mturk/faqs [http://perma.cc/YgAN- 92CK ] . Those with an
approval rating of ninety-five percent or more have had their work accepted at least ninety-
five percent of the time.
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Whatever your verdict may be, it is important that you use fair proce-
dures in forming your judgments about the case and in trying to reach
your verdict. There are several key elements in procedural justice. First,
each juror should consider all the evidence presented about the case in
an open minded way and not be influenced by bias, prejudice, or sym-
pathy. You should focus on facts, and avoid being swayed by either
prejudice or sympathy. Second, when forming your opinions you
should fairly consider all of the evidence. Your job is to identify the
facts you need to apply the law fairly and reach a fair verdict. Third,
when making decisions as a juror it is important that you do your best
to do what is fair for the defendant in terms of the facts of the case and
the laws in your community. These rules are designed to help guarantee
a fair trial, and our law accordingly sets forth serious consequences if
the rules are not followed.
In the no instructions condition, participants did not read any jury instructions
except for the brief explanation of the reasonable doubt standard that partici-
pants in all conditions read.
For the independent variable of timing of instructions, instructions were
given either before or after the presentation of evidence.
For the independent variable of explicit race salience, the salience of race in
the description of the crime was either high or low. In the high race salience
condition, a bystander was heard complaining about an increase in crimes
committed by blacks in the neighborhood. In addition, participants saw a pic-
ture of the black defendant. In the low race salience condition, race was not
mentioned: the bystander was heard complaining about an increase in crime
(not specific to race). In addition, there was no picture of the defendant,
though participants were told the race of the defendant in the written descrip-
tion of the defendant so that they knew the defendant's race among other in-
formation.
For the independent variable of racism category, there were three catego-
ries: non-racist, aversive racist, and true racist. Participants were categorized by
combining each participant's implicit and explicit racism scores. The implicit
racism score had two levels (high and low), which was determined by a median
split of the implicit racism data, obtained using an implicit racism measure de-
signed for online research by Jordan LaBouff." The explicit racism score also
had two levels (high and low), which was determined by a median split of the
explicit racism data obtained using an explicit racism measure, the Modern
121. Jordan LaBouff, A Brief Online Survey-Based Implicit Association Test for Intergroup Atti-
tudes (Jan. 18, 2013) (poster presented at Society for Personality and Social Psychology) (on
file with author) (introducing the Qualtrics-based implicit racism measure).
1719
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Racism Scale." Then four groups were created based on participants' implicit
and explicit scores. Those with both low implicit and low explicit racism scores
were labeled non-racists, as they exhibited a lack of racism in both measures.
There were 104 participants in this group. Those with high implicit and low
explicit racism scores were labeled aversive racists in line with the definition of
aversive racism. There were 81 participants in this group. Lastly, those with
both high implicit and high explicit racism scores were labeled true racists, as
they had high levels of racism in both measures. There were iol participants in
this group. Those who were low in implicit racism and high in explicit racism
were excluded from the subsequent analyses, as this combination is not readily
explainable by any race theories; it is unusual not to have implicit bias but to be
outwardly and explicitly biased. There were 75 participants in this group. 3
Six dependent variables were measured for each crime: guilt of the defend-
ant, confidence in guilt/innocence judgment, perceived prior record, sentence
judgment, recall of evidence, and recognition of evidence. The guilt of the de-
fendant was measured on a seven-point scale (i = not at all likely to be guilty to 7
= extremely likely to be guilty), as was confidence in guilt/innocence judgment (I
= not at all confident to 7 = extremely confident), perceived prior record (i = defi-
nitely not to 7 = definitely), and sentence judgment (I = o years to 7 = 5+ years).'4
Participants' recall of evidence pertaining to the crime was measured by
asking participants to list as much information regarding the crime as they
could remember. 2s Information recalled was coded by counting the number of
incriminating and exonerating pieces of evidence each participant recorded.
The number of times participants mentioned each type of evidence corre-
sponded to their score for that variable; for example, if a participant mentioned
three incriminating pieces of evidence and two exonerating pieces of evidence
for the crime, the score would be three and two for each type of evidence, re-
spectively. Recognition of the evidence pertaining to the crime consisted of
twelve items, six of which had actually been included in the evidence and six of
i2n. John B. McConahay, Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale, in PREJU-
DICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 91, 104 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds.,
1986).
123. The groups had roughly equal numbers because implicit and explicit racism scores were de-
termined by a median split of the data.
124. The two measures consisting of guilt of the defendant and participants' confidence in their
guilt/innocence judgments were adapted from Galen Bodenhausen. See Galen V. Boden-
hausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and Memory: Testing Process Models of Ste-
reotype Use, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 726, 729 (1988). The confidence judgment
was not included in any analyses because it was not related to any of the hypotheses but in-
stead was used to maintain consistency with Bodenhausen's measure.
125. This dependent variable was also adapted from Bodenhausen. Id. at 730, 734.
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which were foils. For each type of evidence (actual evidence and foil evidence),
there were two incriminating statements, two exonerating statements, and two
neutral statements. Participants indicated on a seven-point scale whether they
thought each of the statements had been included in the crime scenario, where
1 = definitely not and 7 = definitely. The neutral pieces of evidence were not in-
cluded in analyses, as they were not related to any hypotheses of the study.
C. Materials
The implicit racism measure was a Qualtrics-based Implicit Association
Test (IAT) that measured participants' levels of implicit racism and operated as
follows. Participants completed three blocks of trials: the first was not of inter-
est, as it was meant to acclimate participants to the task, but the subsequent
two were of interest. In the first block, participants viewed two columns run-
ning down the page pairing categories together -the left column was flow-
er/pleasant and the right column was insect/unpleasant. To the left of the col-
umns were words that fit into one of the two columns: words that describe
flowers (for example, Geranium), words that describe insects (for example,
Centipede), words that describe pleasant things (for example, love), and words
that describe unpleasant things (for example, vomit). Participants had to click
the radio button in the correct column to categorize the terms on the left into
their appropriate groups. Participants were instructed to begin at the top and
run down the left side of the page when categorizing the terms. Participants
were given thirty-five seconds to complete the block, and then the page auto-
matically advanced when time was up. This time was chosen to make it impos-
sible to categorize all terms within the timeframe, causing some terms to be left
unpaired.
After this initial introductory block, the blocks of interest followed. Partici-
pants were not instructed that only these blocks were of interest. These blocks
followed the same procedure as the initial block, but the category pairings
changed. In one of the two subsequent blocks the left column was
black/pleasant and the right column was white/unpleasant; in the other of the
two subsequent blocks the left column was black/unpleasant and the right col-
umn was white/pleasant. The presentation of these blocks was randomized to
prevent any order effects. The words that described pleasant and unpleasant
items were the same as in the first block. Instead of using words to describe
black and white, pictures of black and white males and females were used in
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order to mirror how a traditional race TAT operates. The faces were selected
and matched for age from the Center for Vital Longevity database.12
6
There were 120 trials total, of which 8o were of interest. The trials of inter-
est were those from the second and third blocks. Unfortunately, Qualtrics does
not have the ability to track individual item response times, which is how a
typical TAT is scored. To circumvent this issue, LaBouff's version uses the total
number of correct responses in an extremely limited time to estimate reaction
time in a given condition. The trials were scored using the formula
[(X/Y)SQRT(X-Y)] and the following steps.' First, the TAT items were re-
coded so that correct pairings were coded as 1 and incorrect or no response
pairings were coded as o.' Then the number of trials that the participant got
correct was computed in both the congruent and incongruent versions.2 9 The
congruent version occurs when white is paired with pleasant and black is
paired with unpleasant, because those pairings are more natural pairings for
those who are implicitly racist. The incongruent version occurs when white is
paired with unpleasant and black is paired with pleasant. For the formula, X is
the number correct in whichever condition the participant got more correct
(for example, if incongruent correct is greater than congruent correct, then X =
incongruent correct).3 Y is the number correct in whichever condition the
participant got fewer correct (for example, if incongruent correct is greater
than congruent correct, then Y = congruent correct).' These numbers were
plugged into the formula [(X/Y)SQRT(X-Y)] for each participant. Then the
direction of the effect was reversed for participants who had incongruent scores
that were greater than their congruent scores."3 2 In short, the trials of interest
operated like the TAT, so that high implicit racism corresponds with partici-
pants who answered more items correctly in the congruent condition than in
the incongruent condition.
Explicit racism was measured using the five-point Modern Racism Scale.
Participants were asked the degree to which they agreed with each of seven
126. See Meredith Minear & Denise C. Park, A Lifespan Database of Adult Facial Stimuli, 36 BEHAV.
RES. METHODS, INSTRUMENTS & COMPUTERS 630 (2004); Park Aging Mind Lab., Stimuli,
U. Tax. DA.L., http://agingmind.utdallas.edu/facedb [http://perma.cc/5NJJ-YN63].
127. E-mail from Jordan LaBouff, Professor, Univ. of Me., to author (Apr. 22, 2014, 20:41 EST)
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statements where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree. 3' This measure
was adapted from John McConahay's work.'34 The scale was reliable (a = .73).
D. Procedure
Participants were told that they would read and complete a survey about a
crime scenario to help with research that was examining how jurors evaluate
evidence and determine a defendant's guilt. Participants then read the consent
form and gave their consent. They were then told that they would read a crime
scenario and answer questions about the scenario. Participants in the pre-
evidence instructions condition then read jury instructions. All participants
then were presented with a description of the crime committed and infor-
mation about the suspect.
After reading the description of the crime, participants read thirteen items
of evidence pertaining to the crime. Five items were incriminating, five were
exonerating, and three were neutral. The evidence items were adapted from
Bodenhausen's studies 3' and were randomized to prevent any order effects. Af-
ter reading the evidence, participants in the post-evidence instructions condi-
tion read jury instructions. All participants then answered questions regarding
the defendant's guilt and were asked to recall the evidence and perform a
recognition task with the evidence. Next the participants completed the Qal-




Descriptive statistics are presented in Table i. Any participant who spent
less than twenty seconds reading the jury instructions (as measured by a timer
embedded in Qualtrics, unknown to participants) was excluded from the anal-
yses. It took, on average, one minute to read the instructions, so those who
spent less than twenty seconds reading the instructions likely were not ade-
quately exposed to the independent variable. In total, 50 participants were ex-
cluded from analysis, leaving 362 participants whose responses were analyzed.
133. One of the items was reverse coded.
14. McConahay, supra note 122, at io8.
135. Bodenhausen, supra note 124, at 729.
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B. Main Results
To test whether participants' guilt judgments, perceived prior record, and
sentence judgments differed depending on the content of the jury instructions,
explicit race salience, the participant's racism category, and the timing of in-
structions, I conducted a 4 (content of jury instructions: egalitarian, self-
affirming, procedural justice, none) x 2 (explicit race salience: high, low) x 2
(timing of instructions: pre-evidence, post-evidence) x 3 (participant's racism
category: non-racist, aversive racist, true racist) analysis of variance (ANO-
VA) .36 This ANOVA was run for each of the three dependent variables related
to guilt: guilt judgment, perceived prior record, and sentence judgment, as well
as for the recall and recognition data. There were no significant effects13 for
recognition or recall of data, so these variables were dropped from subsequent
analyses.
The general hypothesis in support of aversive racism theory is that only
aversive racists would change their guilt judgments depending on the level of
explicit race salience and the presence of egalitarian instructions. It was ex-
pected that they would find the black defendant to be most guilty when there
was low explicit race salience and no egalitarian instructions (either no instruc-
tions, self-affirming instructions, or procedural justice instructions). Further,
they would find the black defendant less guilty when race was explicitly salient
136. An ANOVA measures the total variability in an experiment as a result of the variability be-
tween and within groups in order to determine whether there are meaningful differences be-
tween groups. See, e.g., Sylvan Wallenstein et al., Some Statistical Methods Useful in Circula-
tion Research, 47 CIRCULATION RES. 1, 3 (198o). Although continuous variables are typically
analyzed using a multivariate regression, an ANOVA is more appropriate here. Aversive rac-
ism theory is predicated on the different categories of racism: racism is seen as a dichoto-
mous, rather than continuous, variable, so to stay true to the theory, I converted the contin-
uous implicit and explicit racism variables into dichotomous racism categories and ran an
ANOVA.
137. In research, a significant effect is typically when p < .o5. See, e.g., Timothy R. Levine & Craig
R. Hullett, Eta Squared, Partial Eta Squared, and Misreporting of Effect Size in Communication
Research, 28 HuM. COMM. RES. 612, 614 (2002). This technically means that, assuming the
null hypothesis is true, or that the variables are unrelated, there is a five percent chance of
obtaining the relationship between the variables in the given sample. Id. When p < .05, the
null hypothesis is rejected and results are assumed to be significant. Id. When p < .io but >
.05, the results are assumed to be marginally significant. P-values are biased by sample size,
however, so another common measure reported is effect size, which is an estimate of how
closely two variables are related. Id. One such measure of effect size is partial eta squared
(rp2), id. at 616, which, in addition to p-values, I report throughout the Note. The higher
the value, the larger the effect, and the typical rule of thumb is that .20, .50, and .8o are
small, medium, and large effects, respectively. See, e.g., Lee Sechrest & William H. Yeaton,
Magnitudes of Experimental Effects in Social Science Research, 6 EVALUATION REV. 579, 585
(1982).
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or when they read egalitarian instructions. In addition, I wanted to see what
would happen when there were both high explicit race salience and egalitarian
instructions. This part of the study was exploratory and meant to determine
whether explicit race salience and egalitarian instructions are additive and
whether both would suppress aversive racists' biases more than either factor
alone. It was predicted that true racists and non-racists would have the same
ratings of guilt regardless of levels of explicit salience or content of jury instruc-
tions. Moreover, overall there should be a main effect of racism category, such
that true racists should give the highest ratings of guilt to the black defendant,
followed by aversive racists and followed by non-racists.
The general hypothesis in support of social identity theory is that differ-
ences in racism category should not affect judgments of guilt. Rather, for all
participants, judgments of the guilt of the black defendant should be higher
when race is explicitly salient than when it is not explicitly salient. Additional-
ly, participants should rate the defendant as guiltier when there are no self-
affirming instructions (either no instructions, egalitarian instructions, or pro-
cedural justice instructions) than when there are such instructions. Self-
affirming instructions should eliminate any differences in guilt judgment based
on explicit race salience.
The general hypothesis in support of procedural justice is that differences
in racism category should not affect judgments of guilt. Rather, all participants
should rate the defendant as guiltier when there are no procedural justice in-
structions (either no instructions, egalitarian instructions, or self-affirming in-
structions) than when there are such instructions.
The general hypothesis in support of timing is that the debiasing instruc-
tions, if they work, should be more effective if presented earlier, such that
judgments of guilt will be lower when the instructions are presented pre-
evidence than when they are presented post-evidence.
1. Aversive Racism Theory
The results support aversive racism theory. Because I did not find support
for social identity theory and procedural justice, I conducted a power analysis'
138. A power analysis determines the probability of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis when
it is false. Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis, 1 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SdC. 98,
98 (1992). Power is affected by sample size, such that a larger sample is more likely to lead
to correctly rejecting a false null hypothesis than a small sample size. Id. Therefore, too small
of a sample size may result in Type II error, or a false negative. The convention in social
psychology is that .80 sets the value for power. Id. at too. This effectively means that in
running a post hoc power analysis, one wants the result to be at least .80. If the result is less
than .80, the study is underpowered.
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to examine how meaningful these null results were. I found that my study was
underpowered, 3 9 which means that I cannot state that the data provide evi-
dence against social identity theory or procedural justice - rather, these theories
are just not positively supported by the data.
a. Guilt Judgment
The mean guilt rating that non-racists gave the black defendant was less
than the mean guilt rating from aversive racists, which was less than the mean
guilt rating from true racists.' 4° Post hoc comparisons using Tukey's test" re-
vealed that there was a significant difference in guilt judgment between the
non-racists and the true racists, p = .002, but not between the other groups.42
In addition, I performed an exploratory analysis by restricting the sample
further. Instead of including participants who spent at least twenty seconds
reading the jury instructions, I included only participants who spent at least
forty seconds. This exploratory analysis supports aversive racism theory and
surprisingly suggests that there is a marginally significant result in which the
procedural justice instruction led to increased biases for aversive racists.
In this exploratory analysis, there was a marginally significant interaction
between content of instructions and racism category. 43 For the simple effects 4
139. None of the main effects or interactions for guilt judgment approached observed power of
.80, except for the main effect of racism category, which had observed power of .96; the
three-way interaction between content of instructions, timing, and racism category, which
had observed power of .71; and the four-way interaction between all four independent vari-
ables, which had observed power of .79. For all other main effects and interactions for guilt
judgment, observed power ranged from .06 to .41. None of the main effects or interactions
for perceived prior record approached observed power of .80; instead, observed power
ranged from .05 to .42. None of the main effects or interactions for sentence judgment ap-
proached observed power of.8o; instead, observed power ranged from .05 to .61.
140. See infra Figure 1 and Table 2. ANOVA result: F(3, 36o) = 4.61, p =.004, ?7p2 = .037. Means
and standard deviations for each racism category: non-racists (M = 3.13, SD = 1.36), aversive
racists (M = 3.57, SD = 1.46), true racists (M = 3.87, SD = 1.57).
141. Tukey's test is a post hoc pairwise comparison used when there is a significant main effect
but there are more than two levels of a variable. See, e.g., Wallenstein et al., supra note 136,
at 4 (mentioning that there are five groups and that Tukey's test is appropriate for all pair-
wise comparisons). When there are more than two levels of a variable, a significant main ef-
fect does not reveal which levels differ from each other. Tukey's test does just that: it com-
pares the means within the main effect to determine which means differ from each other. In
the sentence accompanying this footnote, Tukey's test revealed that there was only a differ-
ence between the non-racists and the true racists, which clarifies the main effect.
142. See infra Figure i and Table 2.
143. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3. ANOVA result: F(3, 281) = 1.75, p =.078, 7P' = .056.
124:1690 201 5
MITIGATING JURORS' RACIAL BIASES
split by instructions, there was, in the no instructions condition, a significant
difference in judgments of guilt among the racism categories. 45 Post hoc com-
parisons using Tukey's test revealed a significant difference in guilt judgment
between the non-racists and the true racists, p = .013, such that non-racists
who did not read instructions rated the defendant as less guilty than true rac-
ists who did not read instructions.4 6 There were no differences between the
other groups.4 7 For the simple effects split by instructions, there was, in the
procedural justice instructions condition, a marginally significant difference in
judgments of guilt among the racism categories. 48 Post hoc comparisons using
Tukey's test revealed a significant difference in guilt judgments between the
non-racists and the aversive racists, p = .04, such that non-racists who read the
procedural justice instructions rated the defendant as less guilty than aversive
racists who read the procedural justice instructions.4 9 There were no differ-
ences between the other groups."'
For the simple effects split by racism category, there was, in the non-racist
category, a marginally significant difference in judgments of guilt among the
instructions conditions.'5 ' Post hoc comparisons using Tukey's test revealed a
marginally significant difference in guilt judgments between the egalitarian in-
structions and no instructions conditions, p = .057, such that non-racists who
read the egalitarian instructions rated the defendant as guiltier than non-racists
144. When there is an interaction between at least two variables with at least two levels each, a
simple effects test is run to determine where the difference in the interaction lies. Simple ef-
fects measure the differences between means within each level of one of the independent
variables. Oliver Schabenberger et al., Collections of Simple Effects and Their Relationship to
Main Effects and Interactions in Factorials, 54 Am. STATISTICIAN 210, 211 (2000). For example,
in the simple effects analysis of the marginally significant interaction between the content of
instructions and racism category, the data were split by instructions, such that the means of
each racism category were compared with each other within each instructions condition.
Thus, the means of the guilt judgment of the non-racists, aversive racists, and true racists
were compared to each other within the no instructions condition, again within the egalitar-
ian instructions condition, and so forth. The data were then split by racism category, and
the means of each instructions condition were then compared within each racism category.
Therefore, the means of the guilt judgment in the no instructions, egalitarian instructions,
self-affirming instructions, and procedural justice instructions conditions were compared to
each other within the non-racists category, the aversive racists category, and so forth. The
means that differ significantly in any of these comparisons are then reported.
145. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3. ANOVA result: F(3, 56) = 3.35,P =.026, ?lp' = .159.
146. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3.
147. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3.
148. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3. ANOVA result: F(3, 71) = 2.56, p =.062, 17PV = .101.
149. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3.
150. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3.
151. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3. ANOVA result: F(3, 81) = 2.73, p =.05, I/,2 = .095.
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who did not read instructions.1, 2 There were no differences between the other
groups."' For the simple effects split by racism category, there was, in the aver-
sive racist category, a significant difference in judgments of guilt among the in-
structions conditions. s4 Post hoc comparisons using Tukey's test revealed a
significant difference in guilt judgments between the egalitarian instructions
and procedural justice instructions conditions, p = .013, such that aversive rac-
ists who read the egalitarian instructions rated the defendant as less guilty than
those who read the procedural justice instructions."s There were no differences
between the other groups.' s6
b. Perceived Prior Record
Non-racists rated the black defendant as least likely to have a prior criminal
record, followed by aversive racists; true racists rated the black defendant as
most likely to have a prior record. s7 Post hoc comparisons using Tukey's test
revealed a marginally significant difference in perceived prior record judgment
between the non-racists and the true racists, p = .o88, but not between the oth-
er groups.' ss
c. Sentence Judgment
The mean sentence non-racists gave the black defendant was shorter than
the mean sentence from aversive racists, which was shorter than the mean sen-
tence from true racists.'5 9 Post hoc comparisons using Tukey's test revealed a
marginally significant difference in sentence judgment between the non-racists
and the true racists, p = .079, but not between the other groups. 
6
,
152. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3.
153. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3.
is4. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3. ANOVA result: F(3, 61) = 3.46, p =.022, r/72 = .152.
155. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3.
156. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3.
157. See infra Figure 3 and Table 4. ANOVA result: F(3, 360) = 2.41, p =.067, r7 2 = .020. Note
that the result is marginally significant. Means and standard deviations for each racism cate-
gory: non-racists (M = 3.30, SD = 1.23), aversive racists (M = 3.51, SD = 1.31), true racists
(M = 3.72, SD = 1.32).
1S8. See infra Figure 3 and Table 4.
1s9. See infra Figure 4 and Table 5. ANOVA result: F(3, 360) = 2.28, p =.079, r7p, = .o19. Note
that the result is marginally significant. Means and standard deviations for each racism cate-
gory: non-racists (M = 2.79, SD = 1.23), aversive racists (M = 2.95, SD = 1.37), true racists
(M = 3.15, SD = 1.47).
16o. See infra Figure 4 and Table 5.
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In addition, there was a three-way interaction among content of instruc-
tions, timing of instructions, and explicit race salience.161 For simple effects, the
only significant effect was when the data were split by timing and split again
by content of instructions, such that participants' sentence judgments were
longer in the low explicit race salience condition than in the high explicit race
salience condition, and this difference only occurred when the instructions
were egalitarian and presented pre-evidence. 62
2. Timing of Instructions
The only dependent variable that supported the timing hypothesis was the
guilt variable. Participants gave the black defendant a lower guilt rating when
instructions were presented pre-evidence than when they were presented post-
evidence.163
VI. DISCUSSION
This study tested whether jury instructions based on aversive racism theo-
ry, social identity theory, or procedural justice would mitigate juror biases
against black defendants. In addition to investigating how the content of jury
instructions affects judgments of guilt, the study also tested how the timing of
jury instructions affects these judgments. Analyses of the data yield support for
the timing hypothesis, preliminary support for aversive racism theory, and no
support for social identity theory or procedural justice. These results suggest
that judges should include debiasing elements derived from aversive racism
theory in their jury instructions and that they should present these instructions
before the evidence phase of a trial.
A. Support for Timing Hypothesis
In support of the timing hypothesis, participants found the defendant to be
less guilty when the debiasing instructions were presented before the evidence
as compared to when they were presented after the evidence (though the result
was marginally significant) .164 This is a powerful result, as it suggests that
161. See infra Figure 5 and Table 6. ANOVA result: F(2, 360) = 5.27, p = .006, r 2 - .029.
161. See infra Figure 5 and Table 6. ANOVA result: F(2, 52) = 4.30, p = .043, 1P = .078.
2
163. See infra Figure 6 and Table 7. ANOVA result: F(i, 360) = 3.10, p =.079, 717p = .009. Note
that the result is marginally significant. Means and standard deviations for each timing con-
dition: pre-evidence (M = 3.39, SD = 1.40), post-evidence (M = 3.73, SD = 1.54).
164. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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courts should reconsider current procedures for jury instructions. Currently,
judges typically read instructions to the jury after the jurors have heard all the
evidence in a trial. 6 ' According to the results of this study, presenting instruc-
tions before evidence leads to lower biases. Therefore, it would be beneficial for
judges to present debiasing instructions before jurors hear evidence.
B. Support for Aversive Racism Theory
In support of aversive racism theory, there was a significant main effect of
racism category on guilt judgment, 66 and marginally significant main effects
on perceived prior record 67 and sentence judgment, 68 such that non-racists
found the black defendant to be less guilty than aversive racists, who found the
black defendant to be less guilty than true racists.169 Though the only signifi-
cant difference was between the non-racists and true racists,17 ' all of the ratings
trended in the predicted direction. 7' This finding is particularly important, as
it adds to the literature by demonstrating that both implicit and explicit racism
levels predict judgments of guilt, and each contributes separately to these pre-
dictions as shown by the increase in guilt judgments as both implicit and ex-
plicit racism increases.
In further support of aversive racism theory, there was a three-way interac-
tion among content of instructions, timing of instructions, and explicit race sa-
lience. 72 Participants gave the black defendants a longer sentence when explicit
race salience was low than when it was high, but only when egalitarian instruc-
tions were presented pre-evidence. 73 This result supports aversive racism theo-
ry: it suggests that the combination of explicit race salience and egalitarian in-
structions can be powerful in reducing biases. It also supports the exploratory
hypothesis that explicit race salience and egalitarianism may be additive, such
165. Sheehan, supra note 103, at 681-82. I recognize that judges usually also give instructions be-
fore evidence is presented, but generally these instructions are not as extensive as the in-
structions given prior to jury deliberation. In addition, the jury instructions in this Note in-
cluded not only the burden of proof, but also debiasing elements. The timing hypothesis
focused on determining whether, if debiasing instructions are used, they are better used be-
fore or after the presentation of evidence.
166. See supra note 14o and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 140, 157, 159 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 142, 158, 16o and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 140, 157, 159 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
13. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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that their combination is more powerful at reducing biases than either alone. In
addition, this result provides support for the timing hypothesis, as the debi-
asing instructions only had their effect when they were presented pre-evidence.
However, aversive racism theory was not fully supported by the data, as it
should not be necessary that both egalitarian instructions and explicit race sali-
ence be present in order to decrease biases. Both factors should prime egalitari-
an views, so each on its own should have led to decreased biases. Further, ex-
plicit race salience only mattered when there were egalitarian instructions
presented pre-evidence, 74 which deviates from past research in which explicit
race salience affected judgments whenever race was explicitly salient. However,
as previously mentioned, past studies manipulated explicit race salience by in-
cluding a racial factor as part of the impetus for the crime,'17 thereby creating
an interracial crime. Consequently, although explicit race salience mattered in
judgments of guilt, it was confounded by a potential interaction between the
defendant's and victim's race. Because this Note excluded the victim's race in
order to avoid this confounding factor, the data suggest that perhaps the re-
sults from past studies have been driven in part by an interaction between the
defendant's race and the victim's race rather than by explicit race salience alone.
Additionally, although there was a main effect of racism category on guilt
judgment, perceived prior record, and sentence judgment, racism category did
not interact with the content of the instructions or explicit race salience for
guilt judgments or perceived prior record, as predicted by the theory. Instead,
guilt ratings and perceived prior record ratings were the same for aversive rac-
ists (and non-racists and true racists) regardless of the content of the instruc-
tions and explicit race salience. For the findings to fully support aversive racism
theory, the effects of explicit race salience and content of instructions should
have been moderated by racism category.
Though racism category did not interact with content of instructions or ex-
plicit race salience, an exploratory analysis suggests that this interaction may
have occurred for participants who spent at least forty seconds reading the jury
instructions. For the primary data analyses I could eliminate only participants
who spent less than twenty seconds on the page in order to maintain sufficient
statistical power. Eliminating more participants would have excluded too large
a proportion of the total participants. As a result, I ran an exploratory analysis
in which I included only participants who spent at least forty seconds reading
the instructions. This exploratory analysis yielded a significant interaction be-
tween racism category and content of instructions. 176 Within this interaction,
174. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
175. See supra Part II.A.3.
176. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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there was a marginally significant simple effect"z that supports aversive racism
theory: non-racists rated the black defendant as guiltier in the egalitarian con-
dition than in the no instructions condition., 8 At first glance, this does not
support aversive racism theory: non-racists should have low ratings of guilt re-
gardless of whether they are given debiasing instructions. They are non-biased,
so any debiasing instructions will not affect their guilt judgments. However,
those that were labeled non-racists were not actually non-biased. In fact, they
had implicit preferences for blacks, according to the scoring from LaBouff's
Qualtrics-based IAT. This finding is unusual, as most IATs show that very few
individuals have implicit preferences for blacks; most have no preferences be-
tween blacks and whites or else they have a preference for whites over blacks. 79
Regardless of what caused the implicit preference for blacks, it is significant
because the non-racists' results comport with aversive racism theory. Their
baseline bias is in the opposite direction as that of aversive racists. If "non-
racist" participants are implicitly biased against whites but have low explicit
racism, when they read egalitarian instructions they will be reminded of their
egalitarian views and will increase their guilt ratings for black defendants.
Therefore, the finding that non-racists had higher guilt ratings for the black
defendant in the egalitarian instructions condition than in the no instructions
condition actually supports aversive racism theory.
In addition, as in the primary analyses, there was a trend in the predicted
direction, though not significant, in the effect of racism category on guilt rat-
ings, such that in the no instructions condition, non-racists gave the lowest
guilt ratings, followed by aversive racists, and followed by true racists. ' Fur-
ther, aversive racists had lower guilt ratings in the egalitarian condition than in
the procedural justice condition,' 8 ' and this result supports aversive racism the-
ory: the egalitarian instructions reminded them of their desire to be nonbiased,
so they decreased their biases in line with this ideal. Also in line with aversive
racism theory, true racists had very similar ratings in all instructions condi-
tions': since they are racist and do not have egalitarian views, debiasing in-
structions should not decrease their biases.
177. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
1i7. See supra note i52 and accompanying text.
179. The sample was a mixed race sample, so perhaps any minorities in the sample -particularly
blacks -might explain the larger than normal portion of participants that showed an implic-
it preference for blacks. However, running the analyses without the minority participants
produced similar results, so it is unlikely minority participants drove this reverse bias.
18o. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3.
181. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
182. See infra Figure 2 and Table 3.
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C. Lack of Support for Social Identity Theory and Procedural Justice
The data do not support social identity theory; the self-affirming instruc-
tions condition did not decrease biases any more than the other instructions or
no instructions conditions."3 In addition, the explicit race salience data partial-
ly supports aversive racism theory, and hence cannot support social identity
theory, since aversive racism theory and social identity theory predict opposite
results. According to social identity theory, increased salience should lead to
increased biases, whereas according to aversive racism theory, increased sali-
ence should lead to decreased biases. Thus, because the explicit race salience
data supports aversive racism theory, such that higher salience decreased bias-
es, it does not support social identity theory, as higher salience should have in-
creased biases. The data also do not support the procedural justice hypothesis;
the procedural justice instructions condition did not decrease biases any more
than the other instructions or no instructions conditions. Also, in the explora-
tory analysis with participants who spent at least forty seconds on the instruc-
tions page, procedural justice instructions actually caused aversive racists to in-
crease their guilt ratings.18 4
D. Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Although this Note explored many new ideas in the juror decision-making
literature, there were limitations to the study. These limitations include the
mixed race sample, the lack of comparison to a white defendant, the implicit
racism measure employed, and the artificiality of the online setting. Each limi-
tation, and a means to overcome it in fiiture studies, will be addressed in turn.
1. Restriction of Sample to White Participants
In the future it would be prudent to restrict the sample to white partici-
pants, as aversive racism theory is focused on white juror bias, and social iden-
183. One important caveat is that the self-affirming manipulation may have inadvertently pre-
vented participants from feeling self-affirmed. The self-affirming manipulation informs the
subjects that "[s]tudies have shown that ... thinking of their own positive attributes and
experiences" was an experience that could be expected to improve the fairness of their deci-
sion making. Some studies have shown that self-affirmation eliminates bias better when
participants are not aware they are being self-affirmed. See, e.g., David K. Sherman et al., Af-
firmed Yet Unaware: Exploring the Role of Awareness in the Process of Self-Affirmation, 97 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 745, 757 (2oo9). This effect could potentially explain why the
data did not support social identity theory.
184. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tity theory is based on ingroup preferences, so having multiple races interferes
with the results. This may explain why the data did not support social identity
theory - twenty-five percent of the sample consisted of minorities who, under
social identity theory, would have preferences for their own ingroups. Though
running the analyses by restricting the sample to white participants did not
change the results, the restricted sample size may have been too small to show
any meaningful effects. Thus, to test this theory in the future, the sample
should be restricted to white participants.
Another explanation for the mixed support for social identity theory is that
whites are the majority racial group in the United States, and ingroup bias in-
creases as a function of the ingroup's proportionate rarity within the popula-
tion.'s Further, whites are considered to have high status in the United
States,'8 6 and ingroup bias is greater among low-status groups as compared to
high-status groups. 1 7 As a result, ingroup bias may not be as prevalent among
whites as compared with other, lower-status groups. Because whites do not
have low status and do not need to increase their status within society, they
have less motivation to favor the ingroup.
Further, due to prevailing conceptions of inequality in the criminal justice
system, 88 whites may have little motivation to be lenient toward white defend-
ants to combat racism against whites in the justice system and to improve their
own self-image, because whites as a group are not stereotyped as criminals.
Thus, even when whites have low self-esteem, they may not have enough mo-
tivation to express ingroup favoritism to increase self-esteem by further elevat-
ing the status of their already high-status ingroup.
In support of this idea, only when individuals perceive that ingroup bias
will motivate social change will bias lead to an increase in self-esteem. 89 If one
already has high status, there seems to be little need for change. However, it is
185. Brian Mullen et al., Ingroup Bias as a Function of Salience, Relevance, and Status: An Integra-
tion, 22 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 103, 117 (1992).
186. See Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and
Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 878, 892 (2002) (finding that whites are rated highly on both warmth and compe-
tence).
187. See Mullen et al., supra note 185, at 1O9, 117 (stating that three judges determined status after
they read descriptions of the group; high status was when one's ingroup was of higher sta-
tus than an outgroup; and high-status ingroups exhibit significantly greater biases in the
context of artificial groups, but the trend for real high-status groups to exhibit stronger in-
group bias was not significant).
M88. See, e.g., DAvID D. COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE 9 (1999) (stating that inequality between races
in the American criminal justice system is not solely attributable to racism, thereby implying
at least part is attributable to racism).
189. Hewstone et al., supra note 73, at 580.
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still possible that whites think that judging blacks harshly may enact social
change; this may be especially true for whites concerned about the closing sta-
tus gap between blacks and whites. 9 ' Consequently, it would be important in
future studies to measure participants' levels of perceived racial threat to their
ingroup to determine whether this affects their propensity to exhibit ingroup
bias. Presumably, those low in self-esteem and who perceive a closing of the
status gap would be more motivated to discriminate against black defendants
to preserve the social status of their ingroup.
2. Comparison to White Defendant
In interpreting the data, this Note has consistently equated lower judg-
ments of guilt with lower biases; however, lower judgments of guilt do not
necessarily indicate lower biases. In this study, there were only defendants of
one race, whereas in the literature, black defendants have almost always been
compared to white defendants. This comparison enables researchers to con-
clude that there are biases against blacks. Without a comparison, it is difficult
to know whether the baseline guilt judgments are biased; if they are not biased,
the debiasing instructions could actually have created reverse bias and therefore
too much leniency toward the black defendant. Despite a lack of comparison, it
is likely that biases were reduced in the present experiment, as judgments of
guilt differed depending on racism category, suggesting that some participants
had biases. In other words, where participants who had high levels of implicit
and explicit racism gave higher guilt ratings to a black defendant than partici-
pants who had lower levels of implicit and explicit bias, it is reasonable to pre-
sume that the high guilt ratings of the racist participants is at least partly at-
tributable to racial bias.
In addition, the choice to have only one race of defendant was deliberate for
two reasons. First, another independent variable would have made the study
4 x 2 x 2 x 3 x 2, which is even more unwieldy than what is arguably already a
complex study. Second, many ideas tested in the study were new- the implicit
and explicit racism levels, debiasing instructions, and timing manipulations. I
first wanted to test these variables with a black defendant to see if any of the
hypotheses were supported, in the hope of testing any supported variables in a
subsequent study comparing black and white defendants. In line with this idea,
the next stage of research should pursue a comparison between black and white
defendants based on aversive racism theory, as these results mostly supported
aversive racism theory. This study could be 2 X 2 x 3 x 2: content of instructions
(egalitarian, no instructions), timing (pre-evidence, post-evidence), racism cat-
19o. Id. at 585.
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egory (non-racist, aversive racist, true racist), and race of defendant (black,
white). This design would enable the comparison of guilt between black and
white defendants and more accurately determine whether egalitarian instruc-
tions reduce biases.
I attempted to run such an experiment but found an unusual reverse bias
against the white defendant. The origins of this bias are unclear, but I suspect
it had to do with the pictures of the white and black defendant used in the ex-
periment. Though taken from the Center for Vital Longevity database"9 ' and
matched for age and gender, there may have been subtle differences between
the faces that led participants to think that the white defendant looked more
like someone who would commit an assault. 92 One noteworthy conclusion
from the experiment is that the egalitarian instructions eliminated this reverse
bias. 93 This finding serves to counter the potential objection that a debiasing
instruction could cause jurors to overcorrect and favor black defendants, since
it appears to make jurors more objective in their judgments regardless of their
initial racial preference.
3. Qualtrics-Based IAT Limitations
It would be fruitful to employ a new IAT because half of the participants
expressed an unusual reverse bias, compared to at most twenty-five percent in
the general population, 94 and it would be helpful to see if this was due to the
specific measure employed. One such IAT is John Dovidio and colleagues' sub-
191. Minear & Park, supra note 126; Park Aging Mind Lab., supra note 126.
192. Studies have found that when a suspect's appearance makes the suspect look like someone
who would commit a particular crime, such as an assault, that person is judged to be guilty
whereas a suspect that does not look like someone who would commit a particular crime is
found to be innocent. E.g., C. Neil Macrae & John W. Shepherd, Do Criminal Stereotypes
Mediate JuridicJudgements?, 28 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 189, 19o (1989).
193. There was a trend interaction between the race of defendant and content of instructions,
F(1, 557) = 2.56, p =.no, rip 2 = .055. For the simple effects split by content of instructions,
there was a trend in a difference in guilt judgment based on race of defendant when there
were no instructions: the white defendant was judged as guiltier than the black defendant,
F(1, 182) = 2.14, p =.145, Tip = .012. When there were egalitarian instructions, there was no
difference in guilt judgment based on race of defendant, suggesting that the egalitarian in-
structions eliminated the reverse bias against the white defendant.
194. Office of Faculty Dev. & Diversity, FAQ on Implicit Bias, STAN. SCH. MED. (2014),
http://med.stanford.edu/diversity/FAQREDE.html [http://perma.cc/SXNF-7YRS] (re-
porting that seventy-five percent of Asian and white individuals have an implicit preference
for whites over blacks, which means that the remaining twenty-five percent necessarily had
no preference or a reverse bias against whites).
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liminal IAT.' 95 I originally considered using this measure but decided against it
because Amazon Mechanical Turk participants would have to download addi-
tional software to complete the study. This would be burdensome for partici-
pants and would make it more difficult to ensure an adequate sample size, es-
pecially if participants encountered computer difficulties with the software. As
a result, I decided to use LaBouff's measure. It would be beneficial to replicate
my effects with a subliminal IAT, and Dovidio and colleagues' measure would
be a good tool for future research.
4. Artificiality of Laboratory Settings
Laboratory studies, though important in investigating hypotheses because
of their ability to control confounding variables, have limitations in the context
of evaluating jury instructions. These limitations include the following: a la-
boratory study is much shorter than the length of an actual trial, participants
may be less motivated because there is no real defendant whose liberty is at
stake, there is no deliberation, and the jury instructions are presented in a writ-
ten format rather than an oral format. Though these limitations should be con-
sidered in interpreting my results, it is important to begin testing a hypothesis
through an experiment rather than through a field study.
An experiment enables the researcher to keep all variables constant besides
the variables of interest. If I had tested the instructions in actual trials, other
variables could have interfered with my results, such as the attractiveness of the
defendant, the type of crime, and much more, making it difficult to interpret
any results. In addition, it would not have been feasible to test my hypotheses
in real trials without any preliminary evidence in support of my hypotheses. It
is difficult to imagine that judges would have allowed me to test my instruc-
tions in trials, where a defendant faces significant consequences, without any
evidence that these instructions are likely to actually reduce biases.
In addition, though the laboratory aspect of my study is a potential limit-
ing factor of its generalizability, many laboratory experiments related to jury
instructions have been replicated outside the laboratory. For example, field
studies of jury instructions have found that the timing of instructions affects
how well jurors can recall evidence,196 suggesting that timing may not only
matter in my study but also in actual trials. In addition, studies of the incom-
195. See John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled Processes, 33 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 510 (1997).
196. See, e.g., Heuer & Penrod, supra note io8, at 424-25 ("Jurors in criminal trials ... showed a
marginally significant improvement on the [recall] test questions when they were instructed
prior to the evidence.").
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prehensibility of jury instructions'97 have been replicated in actual trials.' 98
Studies such as these suggest that the brevity of laboratory studies, the lack of
an actual defendant, the written nature of the instructions, and the lack of de-
liberation do not necessarily preclude the generalizability of these results to real
trials.' 99
CONCLUSION
This Note tested several novel ideas in the race and juror decision-making
literature. Rather than observing juror biases and creating post hoc explana-
tions for why such biases occur, this study directly tested two theories against
each other. It also examined whether a third race-neutral theory could combat
biases. The content of the jury instructions was a novel contribution of the
study; this content was derived from principles of aversive racism theory (in-
cluding the expanded definition proposed in Part II), social identity theory,
and procedural justice. In addition, the study measured, for the first time, par-
ticipants' implicit and explicit racism levels and employed a new method of
making race salient to eliminate the confounding factor of interracial crime.
The study also manipulated the timing of debiasing instructions to see whether
instructions before or after evidence decreased biases to a greater extent.
The data largely support the timing hypothesis and aversive racism theory,
but not social identity theory or procedural justice. In line with aversive racism
theory, non-racists, aversive racists, and true racists differed in the ratings they
gave the black defendant for the variables of guilt judgment, perceived prior
record, and sentence judgment, as predicted by their implicit and explicit rac-
ism scores. Also consistent with aversive racism theory, the exploratory analysis
suggests that egalitarian instructions lower guilt judgments for aversive racists
only. Lastly, consistent with previous studies, explicit race salience affected
judgments, but only when egalitarian instructions were presented pre-
evidence.
Although there are many possible directions for future research, the most
intriguing and necessary would focus on aversive racism theory. As previously
197. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Juiy Instructions? A Field Test Using
Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 59, lo9 (1998) (finding
that "many of our jurors are misunderstanding at least some of the jury instructions" they
are given).
199. In fact, online studies on Mechanical Turk are likely to be even more generalizable than la-
boratory studies, considering that the sample is more diverse and representative of the gen-
eral population than the typical undergraduate sample. See Paolacci et al., supra note 117, at
413.
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mentioned, it would be important to determine whether, consistent with aver-
sive racism theory, aversive racists judge black defendants to be guiltier than
white defendants when there are no jury instructions, but judge both black and
white defendants to be equally guilty when there are egalitarian instructions.
This Note suggests that not only is it important to combat juror biases, but
also that the origin of such biases is critical in understanding how to decrease
them. The results of this study suggest that guilt judgments are explained
more by aversive racism theory than by social identity theory, and that proce-
dural justice-based jury instructions do not decrease biases. Therefore, making
race salient in the courtroom and tailoring instructions to egalitarianism are
likely to be effective in reducing biases. If, however, social identity theory had
explained the results, then a better approach would have been to flatter jurors
to increase their self-esteem and to keep race salience low to prevent racial in-
group bias. The differences between these potential applications demonstrate
the importance of determining the root cause of juror biases: recommendations
for combatting biases can be exactly the opposite depending on which theory
explains biases, especially regarding whether to make race salient in a court-
room.
The experimental results from this Note suggest that courts might consider
including debiasing elements derived from aversive racism theory in jury in-
structions. Judges would only need to say a few extra sentences in order to fit
the debiasing instructions into current instructions. In addition, presenting
these instructions before the evidence phase of a trial would not be difficult and
could potentially reduce juror biases in a powerful way.
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APPENDIX
Table i.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Dependent Variables Mean SD
Guilt Judgment 3.50 1.46
Perceived Prior Record 3.55 1.28
Sentence Judgment 3.03 1.39
Note. Ratings were made on a scale of i to 7.
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Non-Racist Aversive Racist True Racist
Racism Category
Table 2.
MEAN RATINGS OF GUILT AS A FUNCTION OF RACISM CATEGORY
Racism Category Mean Ratings of Guilt
Non-Racist 3.13a (.14)
Aversive Racist 3.57ab (.16)
True Racist 3. 8 7b (.14)
Note. Means that do not share subscripts differ significantly (p = .002) by Tukey's test.
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Non-Racist Aversive Racist True Racist
Racism Category
- Egalitarian - Self-Affirming 9 Procedural Justice -=0-None
Table 3.
MEAN RATINGS OF GUILT AS A FUNCTION OF CONTENT OF INSTRUCTIONS AND RACISM
CATEGORY
Racism Category
Instructions Non-Racist Aversive Racist True Racist
Egalitarian 3.71 a (.32) 2.67' (.44) 3.76' (.29)
Self-Affirming 3 5 0 ab (.31) 3 .6 2 ab (.32) 4.05aa (.33)
Procedural Justice 3 .0 0 ab (.30) 4.4b (.42) 
3
.60b .
None 2.56ba (.36) 3.35aba (.35) 4.00a(. 36)
Note. This analysis was exploratory and marginally significant (p = .078). Means that
do not share subscripts within each row differ significantly from each other by simple
effects. Means that do not share superscripts within each column differ significantly
from each other. In the third row (procedural justice) and the first column (non-
racist), however, the difference between non-racists and aversive racists and egalitarian
and no instructions, respectively, is only marginally significant. Numbers in parenthe-
ses refer to standard errors. Guilt ratings were made on a scale of 1 to 7.
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Non-Racist Aversive Racist True Racist
Racism Category
Table 4.
MEAN RATINGS OF PERCEIVED PRIOR RECORD AS A FUNCTION OF RACISM
CATEGORY
Racism Category Mean Ratings of Perceived Prior Record
Non-Racist 3.30a (.13)
Aversive Racist 3.51ab (.14)
True Racist 3.72 b (.13)
Note. Means that do not share subscripts differ marginally significantly (p = .o67) by
Tukey's test. Numbers in parentheses refer to standard errors. Ratings of perceived
prior record were made on a scale of i to 7.
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Non-Racist Aversive Racist True Racist
Racism Category
Table 5.
MEAN RATINGS OF SENTENCE JUDGMENT AS A FUNCTION OF RACISM CATEGORY
Racism Category Mean Ratings of Sentence Judgment
Non-Racist 2.79a (.14)
Aversive Racist 2 .95ab (.15)
True Racist 3.15b (.14)
Note. Means that do not share subscripts differ marginally significantly (p = .079) by
Tukey's test. Numbers in parentheses refer to standard errors. Participants indicated
the appropriate sentence for the defendant on a scale of i to 7.
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Figure 5.
MEAN SENTENCE JUDGMENT AS A FUNCTION OF CONTENT OF INSTRUCTIONS,
TIMING OF INSTRUCTIONS, AND EXPLICIT SALIENCE







Low Race Salience High Race Salience
Egalitarian Instructions, Pre-Evidence
Table 6.
MEAN SENTENCE JUDGMENT AS A FUNCTION OF CONTENT OF INSTRUCTIONS,
TIMING OF INSTRUCTIONS, AND EXPLICIT SALIENCE
Content of Explicit Timing of Instructions
Instructions Salience Pre-Evidence Post-Evidence
Low 3-44a (.24) 2.44ab (.27)
High 2. 6 2b (.30) 3. 2 4ab (.30)
Low 3.31, (.27) 2.62, (.38)
High 3.04. (.27) 2.81, (.22)
Proceduraljustice Low 2. 8 6 d (.26) 375d (.31)
High 3. 0 5d (.30) 2.9 6 d (.27)
Low 3.04e (.26) --None
High 3.24c (.26) --
Note. Means within each subsection consisting of instructions that do not share any
part of a subscript within each row and column differ significantly (p = .043) from each
other by simple effects. In other words, the only difference is within the egalitarian in-
structions subsection for the pre-evidence timing of instructions between low and high
explicit salience. Numbers in parentheses refer to standard errors. Participants indicat-
ed the appropriate sentence for the defendant on a scale ofl to 7.
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MEAN RATINGS OF GUILT AS A FUNCTION OF TIMING OF INSTRUCTIONS
Timing of Instructions Mean Ratings of Guilt
Pre-Evidence 339a (.o)
Post-Evidence 3-73b (.13)
Note. Means that do not share subscripts differ marginally significantly (p = .079).
Numbers in parentheses refer to standard errors.
Fl
Pre-Evi
